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WOMEN AND THE FAMILY:

AN EXAMINATION

OF FALSE UNIVERSALITY
H e ge l’s consideration of the family begins in the
third part of the Philosophy of Right which is concerned
with Ethical Life.

In the Hegelian analysis of Right,

of the development of the Idea of freedom as the embodiment
of the free will, ethical life is "the unity of the will in
its concept with the will of the individual."^

Hegel terms

ethical life the "truth" of the two abstract moments, Fo r
mal Right and Morality insofar as formal right is the will
in its immediacy and its embodiment in an immediate external
thing, while Morality is the will reflected from this e x 
ternal embodiment into itself.

In synthesizing these two

moments. Ethical Life is the stage of development of the
Idea of the absolutely free will in which the good is not
only conceptual, but is also realized both in the will r e 
flected into itself and in the external world, resulting in
the existence of freedom as substance, actuality, and as
necessity.

Thus, Ethical Life is ". . . the Idea in its

absolutely universal existence."

Ethical substance h o w 

ever is similarly dialectical, involving three significant
moments which are:

1) the natural mind or the Family,

2) the division and appearance of the natural mind or
Civil Society, 3) the State as universal and objective
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freedom even in the free self-subsistence of the particular
will.

The dialectical movement of this relationship thus

begins with the actual and organic mind of a single nation
which reveals and actualizes itself through the interrela
tion of the particular national minds until in the process
of world history it reveals and actualizes itself as the
universal world-mind whose right is supreme.
Ethical Life is the concept of freedom developed
into the existing world as the good endowed with selfconscious knowing and action.

It is also the nature of

self-consciousness insofar as the ethical realm is the
3
absolute foundation and ultimate end of self-consciousness.
This is not to say, however, that the ethical order is
purely transcendent, for it is a substance which rises to
self-consciousness in individuals and is actualized only for
that reason.

As the unity of the concept of the will with

the particular will, the Ethical Attitude presents an
objective/subjective distinction, but it is one in which
the subjective and objective elements so modify one another
as to constitute two syntheses of object and subject, each
of which is the totality of the Idea.
The first "totality" is ethical life regarded o b 
jectively.

Its form is subjective which is to say that its

substance is made concrete by subjectivity as infinite form.
The State and its institutions (as ideal) exemplify the o b 
jectivity of ethical life but the legitimizing force of those

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

institutions depends upon the self-consciousness of the citi
zens.

The other two stages of ethical life, viz.

the family

and civil society, also constitute a substantiality in
Hegelian terms to the extent that each has subsistence in
itself.

In this sense, the family is a substance of which

its members are accidents, although the substantiality is
not external or visible.
its bond of love.

Instead the family's substance is

In Hegel's view this love is reason in

its immediacy, i.e., it is an immature form of reason.
There is no explicit difference between substance and acci
dent in the family for the family's focus is on its unity
rather than on its differences.

In the next stage, civil

society, difference becomes explicit and the substance appears
in the particulars.

In this stage the individuals have risen

above love to intelligence but it is concentrated on a pri
vate end.

The third stage is then the synthesis of the first

two or the particularization of the substantial mind of the
nation into rational laws and institutions.

Regarded o b 

jectively, the ethical order is thus a circle of necessity
whose moments are the ethical powers regulating the life of
the individual and culminating in the political situation
in which what the state's compulsive power exacts, the indi
vidual also wills.
The second synthesis of the Ethical Attitude,

i.e.,

of the unity of the concept of the will with the particular
will, is the subjective view of ethical life.

Here the
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ethical will of the individual is aware of objective duties
as the means by which one actualizes his own inner univer
sality.

This ethical substance and its laws stand over

against the subject in one sense, having an absolute authority
and power.

At the same time these powers are not alien to

the subject for they are directly linked to him by a relation
in which the ethical order is the actual soul of selfconsciousness.
Hegel argues that the laws and institutions of the
Ethical Order are binding on the will of the individual b e 
cause he distinguishes himself from them as subjective and
therefore stands related to them as the substance of his own
being.

Furthermore, the individual finds his liberation in

duty, first, from dependence on mere natural impulse and from
the depression which as a particular subject he cannot escape
in his moral reflection on what ought to be and what might be,
and second, from the indeterminate subjectivity which remains
self-enclosed and devoid of actuality.

Thus Hegel argues

that the individual acquires his substantive freedom in duty.
Hegel goes on to suggest that the substance of mind
exists for the first time as mind when the habitual practice
of ethical living appears as a second nature which is the
soul of custom permeating the natural will.

With this de

velopment the substantial Ethical Order attains its right
and the validity of its right insofar as the self-will of
the individual as opposed to ethical substance vanishes.
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When his character is ethical, Hegel understands the individ
ual as recognizing the universal as the end which moves him
to act.

Further, this individual knows that his dignity and

the whole stability of his particular ends are grounded in
this same universal.

Thus subjectivity becomes itself the

absolute form and existent actuality of the substantial
order, and the distinction between the subject and the sub
stance (i.e., the object or end of the subject) vanishes in
the same way as the formal distinction between the individ
ual's will and the ethical substance.
In belonging to an actual ethical order, the individual
is guaranteed two rights, the first that of being subjectively
destined to freedom, and the second the right to particular
satisfaction.

The first right of one's subjective destiny

issues from the individual's conviction that his freedom
realizes its truth in the Objective order and in the fact that
an individual is actually in possession of his own essence or
inner universality when he is a member of an ethical order.
The second right to particular satisfaction is contained in
the ethical substantial order since particularity is the out
ward appearance of that order.

Thus Hegel suggests that right

and duty coalesce in the identity of the universal will with
the particular will.

Further, a man who is part of an ethical

order has rights insofar as he has duties and duties insofar
as he has rights, which moves beyond the sphere of abstract
right where I have a right and someone else has a corresponding
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duty, as well as beyond the sphere of morality where the
right of an individual’s private judgment and will has not,
but only ought to have, coalesced with duties and become
objective.

This ethical substance, as the unity of indi

vidual self-consciousness with its concept is for Hegel
the actual mind of a family and of a nation.
The concept of this Idea, i.e., the union of selfconsciousness and its concept, is mind as something knowing
itself and actual.

This mind then, objectifies itself in

the movement running through the form of its moments, viz.
universality, particularity, and individuality.

The objec

tification of each of these moments is a different form of
organization.

Thus, the ethical mind in its natural or

immediate phase is first the Family.

Thus substantiality

loses its unity and passes into division and the phase of
relation which is Civil Society.

Civil Society is an asso

ciation of members as self-subsistent individuals in a uni 
versality which is only abstract.

Their association is

brought about by their needs, by the legal system, and by
an external organization for attaining their particular and
common interests.

This external state is brought back to

and unified with the state in the Constitution of the State
which is the end and actuality of both the substantial u n i 
versal order and public life.
From this sketch it is possible to begin extracting
the more significant aspects of both regressive and progressive
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tendencies in the Hegelian dialectic structuring the realiza
tion of the State and true self-conscious freedom.

It is

important to identify and separate the features of each ten
dency because the utopian idealism generated by the logic of
Hegel's argument is critically undermined by the contradictory
material conditions which it ignores.

Nevertheless, the con

cept of a "necessary" movement structuring the progression of
human history toward an actualization of human freedom is far
too rich to simply dismiss.

While such a concept may indeed

bear little resemblance to the pattern of events in either our
private or our public lives today, and may in fact suggest
uncomfortable associations with the brutally executed notions
"progress," "Manifest Destiny," or various religious crusades
which legitimized acts of oppression toward particular groups
or towards the natural environment, the idea of historical
progression on a rational basis articulates the concern for
a rational and ethical society that is rapidly fading from
the discussion and consideration of "practical" men.
It is generally agreed that the democratic society
protects individual rights by limiting individual freedom,
but it is difficult to generate productive discussion of the
nature of that paradigmatic state of individuality for which
various concepts of rights and freedom are developed.

Today

as the problems of alienation as seen in loneliness, unsat
isfactory personal relationships, and a decreasing ability
to engage the objective substance of one's life, become more
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acute, the meaning of individual or civil rights becomes more
obscure.

The traditional understanding of civil rights by

means of a kind of training in the art of self’•defense,
wherein one acknowledges the rights of others in order to
guarantee his own, apparently cannot speak to the situation
in which one seeks integration with rather than protection
from the general community.

Without attempting to deny the

importance of legal protection against the selfish, or p a r 
ticularistic, aims of other individuals in civil society,
the primary concern for the individual and his property seems
at the very least to address only part of the problems with
which people are confronted as members of a social organiza
tion, viz. those concerning matters of contract, production,
and private ownership.

Beyond these parameters there is a

sudden but deliberate emptiness about the concept of indi
vidual rights which, while theoretically based on the idea
of individual freedom and self-determination, extends its
would-be "non-interference" into an official negation of
public responsibility for the quality of life made possible
by the structure of interdependence in civil society, and
consequently for the quality or actualization of human beings
in that society.
The idea of public responsibility for the quality of
life in democratic civil society fairly bristles with issues
concerning restriction and imposition upon the individual
insofar as the notion of human commonality is understood as
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the homogenization of human variety.

Thus H egel’s percep

tion of a political situation in which the individual wills
what the state's compulsive power exacts might all too easily
be shunned as the totalitarian sort of political ideal that
must result from any idealistic, naive scheme to realize a
unity of individual wills.

Were it not for Hegel’s charac

terization of the State as the final and ultimate moment of
the necessary progression of rationality,

i.e., or Ethical

Life, it would in fact be difficult to separate the specific
features of individual actualization from individual repres
sion with respect to the concept of the state.

Thus, if the

notion of personal autonomy is defined by reference to a
fundamental opposition or difference of particular wills,
the suggestion of agreement between individuals seems to be
without practical application unless arbitrarily enforced by
an authoritarian power.

But He gel’s conception of ethical

life rests upon the central feature of a circle of necessity
uniting the three objective moments, universality, particu
larity, and individuality, and in so doing casts the nature
of the political State in terms of the individual family.
The fact that it is the family rather than the state
which objectifies the rational "moment" of universality d e 
mands first, that Hegel’s vision of a political situation
necessitating human freedom must be understood as the inclu
sion of the unique capacity of the family to know the indi
vidual above and beyond his accomplishments and/or "crimes,"
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to be radically concerned about his welfare, and yet to per
ceive his importance as no greater and no less than that of
any other family member.

While the suggestion of total

political unity appears to threaten the real possibility of
individuality, the family's unity, to the extent that it
provides care, concern, and guidance, and a generally s us 
taining environment for the individual's development, is
the source of individuality, inevitably shaping it to some
degree in or against its own character, but fundamentally
giving individuality life, maintenance and its essential
context.

The success of family unity can be most profitably

assessed in terms of the freedom of the individual family
member in his relationships and activities outside of the
family per se insofar as the causal connection between a
neglected or deprived child (as well as a restricted and
unhappy parent), and a socially irresponsible or aberrant
citizen has been established through the work of social
scientists and researchers.
Furthermore, Hegel's circle of necessity firmly con
nects the realization of the State with the experience of
family unity in such a way as to demand a clear awareness
on the part of the individual of his own dependence upon
the source of unity for his fullest and most free being.
In this sense Hegel's dialectic reveals the centrality of
the experience of universality to the political situation
in which the legitimization of authority can be in fact
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traced to the individual as a free and responsible citizen.
The emphasis on the sense of self as part of and dependent
upon a group which peculiarly characterizes the family can
not be overstated, for it is particularly with the family
that such a subordination of individuality can be understood
as essentially progressive.

It is important, however, not

to confuse the contemporary increase in family disunity and
instability with Hegel's perception of the family as r a 
tionality realizing objective universality and thereby con
clude that it is only the family's nominal bonds which need
be considered essential to the state, regardless of the way
in which the individual is integrated into this family.

A

subordination of the individual to a family (or other group)
which does not express care for the development of the in
dividual, but rather a neglect and disregard for the individ
ual that is tantamount to a denial of individual being,
implies a concept of the family that has little to do with
Hegel's ideal realization of freedom except as a point of
critique.

To confront the contemporary charges of domina

tion and repression of individuality with respect to the
family is to raise the question of control, now not only
as it affects and divides family members, but also as it
negates and falsifies the authority of the State.
Because Hegel does not distinguish between oppressive
features of family life and those necessary to its substan
tiality, it is important to exclude those philosophic

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12

arguments which overlook a regressive material manifestation
from an overall appreciation of the movement from family to
State.

The issue of control is perhaps the question requir

ing the most immediate attention in a review of H e g e l ’s
treatment of Ethical Life insofar as the problem of domina
tion within a family setting grounds the question of women's
rights and by and large defines the questions of family ef
fectiveness in contemporary society, as well as those experi
ences of estrangement and antagonism toward the family on the
part of many individuals today.

While it would be foolhardy

to attempt to "answer" these questions, particularly given
the conditions of democratic society, an analysis and critique
of the Hegelian dialectic can open the question of how and
why the family, as the primary moment of universality in most
individuals’ experience, loses its capacity to instill in its
members a responsiveness and appreciation for what is basically
the brotherhood of all men.

The significance of this question,

however, radically exceeds the level of "family counseling"
insofar as its dimensions include, in the manner of Hegel's
circle of necessity, the nature of the state and the legiti
mization of its authority.
In his essay, "A Study on Authority," H. Marcuse
analyzes Hegel's construction of the state out of the will
of individuals as a sketch of the development of authori
tarian consciousness.

He suggests that Hegel's ultimate

goal of the free subordination of the individual will to
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the general will of state requires a deliberate fostering of
a state-upholding sentiment in the psyche of the individual
for which the institutions of the state in their finished
form are not adequate.

The preparation for a voluntary

recognition of, and subordination to, the state's authority
must therefore begin much farther back in the history of the
individual, viz. through the situation of the "corporations"
of civil society to the family.

The Corporations in Hegel's

notion of civil society are the second ethical root of the
state, and enable the individual to achieve civil recognition
within the general community on the basis of his own recogni
tion of the universality of that community's institutions.
The family however, as the prior and more basic ethical root,
brings out characteristics in the individual which enables
him to become a part of the state which represents "objec
tive" morality.^
The case was previously made for the importance of
those characteristics, for which the family is the primary
source, that generally develop a consciousness of linkage
between individuals based not on the calculated realization
of selfish aims, but rather on the realization that authentic
free individuality must emerge from universality.

By turning

to the question of authoritarian consciousness, Marcuse
focuses on the problematic character of that "universality"
in its practical as opposed to theoretical development, first,
by means of family organization, and later, by acknowledgment
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of the state's legislative authority.

The necessity of or

ganizational authority in either case does not present the
significant conflict with which Marcuse is concerned, but
rather the relationship between servitude and domination
which generally defines family organization and which con
tributes to the construction of an authoritative socio
political order.

Much of his critique refers to Hegel's

Phenomenology of M i n d , but he also quotes from Hegel's
System of Morality where the family is referred to as the
"external openly manifested element of the relationship
between domination and servitude in its indifference,"^
For Hegel human existence is primarily selfconsciousness, but self-consciousness is only 'in and for
iself' when it is in and for itself through another.
Marcuse observes, however, that this kind of recognition
by another occurs for Hegel after a "life and death struggle
in the realm of appropriation and property, work and service,
fear and discipline."

The domination of the master consists

of greed for the enjoyment of things, appropriation as the
sensuous acquisition of property, and the binding of the sub
ordinated person through the 'work' which is forced upon him.
In contrast, the servitude of the servant consists in his
material powerlessness, his absolute fear of the master, his
constant

'discipline' of service and most importantly in his

being chained to his work which makes him dependent on things,
and consequently on the master who owns them.

Marcuse notes
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here that Hegel's decisive insight is that domination and
servitude only become possible through a particular form of
the labor process.
Hegel goes on to argue that domination can only b e 
come real as a recognized power over the realm in which
things are at its disposal through the labor performed in
servitude, so that "the truth of independent consciousness
is thus the consciousness of the bondsman."^

Hegel's ex

planation of this is that the features of the most extreme
powerlessness and dependence, viz. Fear and Service

(dis

cipline and obedience) are the very forces that drive servi
tude out of its state of dependence by forcing the servant
on pain of fear of the master, into the labor process where
his real power will reveal itself and where he will come
'to h i m s e l f .

Thus it is ultimately the serving-consciousness

which has acquired its true form in the labor-process that is
the real point of transition in the supercession of the
domination-servitude relationship.

From this Marcuse con

cludes that it is not absolute reason but absolute force that
stands at the beginning of the 'objective spirit'.
With this conclusion Marcuse opens the fundamental
dynamic of the Hegelian dialectic, viz. the force of reason
advancing through its moments of objectification to its full
realization,

to the critical objections of those for whom the

process of acquiring self-consciousness is easily confused
with the process of providing the material basis for another's
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physical, immediate comfort.

In this sense Hegel^s percep

tion of the theoretical "forces" driving servitude out of
its state of dependence grievously ignores the violent and
repressive nature of the actively dominating force, as well
as its implications for a political system requiring such a
relationship at its root.

While Hegel's perception of the

human need for objectification in the real or natural world
is grounded in the phenomenological process of selfrealization by means of an engagement with the world in
which one lives, the notion of the need for a dominating
force introduces elements of inequality and disparity b e 
tween individuals that give a logical basis to the exploita
tion of one individual's labor power by another.

Thus the

theoretical perception of a realizing of self-consciousness
overlooks the extent to which an individual's labor can
either be prevented from, or perverted in, objectifying
individual being when the production process, as well as
the product, are alienated from the laborer.
In his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,
Marx considers Hegel's treatment of the essence of man as
self-consciousness from the point of view of the individual
who leads an alienated life.

Working within Hegel's

phenomenological analysis of the estrangement of human
essence, or the alienation of self-consciousness natural
to an active,

living being, Marx focuses on the manner of

reappropriation of the "objective essence of man" in which
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the moment of alienation experienced by selfTConsciousness
is annulled or superceded, allowing consciousness to r e 
unify itself.

Marx argues that Hegel is merely concerned

with annulling the objective character of the object insofar
as consciousness, or reason, knows itself only by means of
the process of externalization or estrangement of selfconsciousness.

Thus, Hegel finds the rational perception

of the essential dependence of the self upon its various
forms of objectification so binding upon the being of selfconsciousness as to make the character of the estranged
externalized consciousness inconsequential.

In practical,

everyday terms this is as much as to say that a critical
approach to the material conditions of one's life is without
practical obligation to change or in some way affect them,
for the nature of being is such that its identity is, in
the first place, dependent upon the conditions in which it
finds itself reflected, and is in the second place, beyond
the realm of those material conditions which only accidentally
impose upon it.

For Marx, the implication that self-conscious

man can recognize, annul and supercede the spiritual world as
self-alienation and yet confirm it in its alienated shape as
his true mode of being is the root of Hegel's "false posi
tivism."

Calling this an attempt to put "reason at home in

unreason as unreason," Marx objects to the implication that
self-affirmation in contradiction with itself can yet be true
knowledge and life.

Instead he argues that if one knows
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religion as alienated human self-consciousness, for example,
then one realizes himself in annihilated and superceded
O

religion, not in religion itself.
In his critique Marx is particularly concerned with
Hegel's act of compliance toward religion, the state, and
its institutions insofar as Hegel's analysis of the dialectic
between the rational individual and his world leaves the in
dividual necessarily engaged with the reification of his
alienated self-consciousness.

For Marcuse, who approaches

this process with an eye towards labor and production, the
contradiction of "reason at home in unreason as unreason"
negates the motive force of reason insofar as the movement
of one's reappropriation of his objectivity is brought to
a halt with the coexistence of the rational and the irra
tional.

In terms of the dialectic between the family,

civil society and the state, Hegel's compromise of reason
at the point of one's recognition that what is the objecti
fication of the self is in fact alienated self-consciousness
implies that the individual's growth and development toward
his freedom or necessary and full rationality is of secon
dary importance to his capacity to conform to the demands
of a political and social situation that gives his particu
lar identity form by opposing it.
To the extent that Hegel can be understood as con 
cerned for the support and maintenance of the status quo,
the family's universality thus begins to appear as quite a
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bit less than the primary experience of the integration of
the self into a group or community by means of caring, r e 
sponsive and emotional bonds between human beings.

Instead,

the family experience appears as the primary experience of
the self as circumscribed and restricted by a group on which
it is radically dependent despite the impossibility of a
holistic synthesis between the self as alienated and particu
lar and his identity as family member.

The specific split in

self-consciousness facilitated by Hegel's acceptance of the
"confirmation . . . of the self-estranged essence in its deg
niai,"
is therefore the rational origin of the split b e 
tween an individual’s identity in self-consciousness and
reason, and his identity as a member of a productive unit.
For men and women employed as wage labor, this personal
fragmentation is most readily apparent as a feature of civil
society and their activities in that sphere.

For women, it

is also a feature of family life negating not only the w o m a n ’s
experience of primary universality, but also the substantiality
of familial unity at all insofar as the disparity between a
woman's service to her family and that of the other family
members to the family and the woman reduces her objective
being in accordance with her presence as wife, mother, house
keeper, etc.
Marx's critique strikes at the rupture in Hegel's
phenomenological dialectic as a point of logical breakdown
that permits a philosophical justification of actual servitude.
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With respect to the situation of women in the family, this
rupture can be seen as the source of a more profound and
socially far-reaching manifestation of the development of
an authoritarian consciousness than the strictly logical
criticism implies.

To some extent it is the fact that the

family does provide the historical source of the average
individual's understanding of political organization that
most critically demands the publicizing and analysis of
the woman's "role" in the family insofar as what Hegel took
to be the fundamental, ethical experience of universality
must be acknowledged as flawed.

In this sense it would a p 

pear at best naive to campaign, particularly at the risk of
one's life, for the "ideal" society when the most elemental
model of human unity and organization as based on bonds of
human empathy and respect is itself the embodiment of nega
tion, abuse, exploitation, and alienated consciousness.
If women can merely aspire to a rational negation of
the role(s) provided for their participation and integration
into the family as it is structured today it is doubtful
that any real progress can be made by means of their new
awareness.

To the extent that the family remains a facade

of unity that finds justification for the relationships of
servitude and therefore domination on which it depends, the
primary experience of all future individuals will be just as
characterized by inequality and exploitation between human
beings as it was before the idea of women's oppression
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vis-a-vis the family caught public attention.

In short, the

simple condemnation of an enforced role such as that of wife
and mother cannot compensate for the manifestations of selfabnegation which issue from the acceptance and use of alien
ated self-consciousness.

It is not enough for women to

recognize the extent to which their own development as an
individual is stunted by the demands made upon them in the
name of the experience of universality, for not only do they
risk a daily decrease in their realization of "being-foritself," i.e., their truly human potential, but they simul
taneously contribute to the notion of a socially unavoidable
level of exploitation by permitting and participating in an
experience of false universality on which society as a whole
depends for a reference in the construction of a rational
society and State.
The problem at hand might therefore be defined as:
how to liberate women from their restrictive and alienating
roles as made necessary by the family without destroying the
family in the process, with the most critical issue in terms
of the current w o m e n ’s movement being whether or not there
is really any progress made towards equal opportunity for a
w o m an’s realization of individuality if her social (in the
sense of human) obligations are defined in terms of her
relation to the family and child-rearing, and if her own
development is contingent upon this definition.

In this

sense, it is important to confront the sexual division of
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labor which seems to place the onus of social responsibility
as squarely on the w o m a n ’s shoulders in a revolutionary
society as it does in bourgeois society; for if a woman must
always define her individuality, i.e., self, in the face of
the family’s, and by extension other individuals', demands
it is certain that any future revolutionary society will be
as flawed by the dynamics of a domination-servitude relation
ship as any previously known.

At the same time, the signifi

cance of feminity as it is used as a symbol for all of the
features of a human relationship that are out of place in the
routine activities of civil society must not be lost to the
urgency of recouping w o m e n ’s historical "losses."

Whether or

not individual women can identify with the qualities of car
ing, warmth, emotional response, and noncalculative use of
other human beings, it is hardly the legitimate aim of a
revolutionary society to eliminate these aspects of human
being, typically associated with femininity though they are,
from the human spirit.

Thus, it again becomes essential to

recognize the extent to which a nominal rectification of the
w o m a n ’s role in the family is, e.g., by means of greater
opportunities for integration into civil society, does not
in fact contribute to the construction of a society in which
genuine freedom, i.e., individuality, is a real possibility.
Although the exclusion of women from various pursuits and
activities in civil society certainly typifies the way in
which women are prevented from experiencing the essential
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externalization and objectification requisite to individual
development, the dialectical relation between the family and
civil society assures the eclipse of those very opportunities
not only for women, but for most men as well, if the experi
ence of universality in the family is not firmly established
in the consciousness of the young, "pre-individuals."
Perhaps the most common and most frequent charge
against any feminist movement is that of accusing the individ
ual woman of neglecting her family out of her own egoistic con 
cerns.

It is primarily as a question of time and attention

to "duty" that a woman finds herself faced with a choice b e 
tween life as a member of the family and life as a member of
civil society insofar as the family in bourgeois society
cannot accommodate the woman who realizes and resents or r e 
fuses the limitations of a life confined to the parameters of
the home.

While the most binding imperatives, viz., those

that are economic, for a w o m a n ’s total absorption into her
family differ widely from class to class, the criticism of
her attempts to break this bondage as just offered on the
basis of the needs of the family distinctly echoes the long
history of conservative reaction to the w o m e n ’s movement.
Indeed, it would appear that the notion of a universal
feminine obligation to not only undertake motherhood, but
to also devote a significant part of one ’s life as a woman
to it, is so pervasive that even a revolutionary dream of
the better or "ideal" society must return to the solid
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material base of conscientious and ethical mothers who will
provide the reproductive source of the future citizenry.
But the woman of today must object to this kind of cate
gorization of themselves as the reproductive organs of
mankind first, on the grounds of their own being as c o n 
sciousness and Hegel's sense of reason which, when denied
free movement toward the as yet unrealized point of full
development, stands as the negation of human freedom.

They

must also object out of a concern for the same historical
progression that inspires all revolutionary consciousness
nsofar as any avoidable acquiescence to conditions imposed
oy the status quo interferes with that progression either
directly or indirectly.
In his Introduction to the Critique of the Philosophy
of Right, Marx accuses German philosophy of being the ideal
prolongation of German history insofar as he finds Germans
to be living their "post-history" in thought or in philoso
phy.^®

"In politics," he says, "the Germans have thought

what other nations d i d ,"^^ acting in effect as their
theoretical consciousness.

Marx regards Hegel's criticism

of the German philosophy of right and of the state as both
a critical analysis of the modern state and the definitive
negation of all the past forms of consciousness in German
jurisprudence and politics, but notes the contradiction in
the fact that while Germany can produce this speculative
philosophy of right, the German representative of the
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m o d e m state which leaves the real man out of account is
only possible because the modern state itself leaves the
real man out of account.
Similarly, the speculative sort of criticism of
the woman's role in the family today cannot of itself trans
form the woman's place in the family despite the public
appearance of women in more of the activities and business
of civil society.

Marx goes on to say that the criticism

of speculative philosophy of right suggests tasks that can
only be solved by means of practical activity, which is to
say that theoretical needs must become immediate practical
needs.

12

In this sense, the theoretical needs of humanity

vis-a-vis universality must be realized through the material
imperatives of practical situations, the most immediate of
which, with respect to the family, is the woman's release or
liberation from the serving mentality of the individual to
whom all responsibility for the mundane activities of caring
for, sustaining and maintaining a family group devolve.
Hegel's analysis of the family as the ethical root of the
state is valuable as an articulation of the centrality of
the woman's relationship within the family to the wider situa
tions of society and the individual, but as philosophy it can
only be realized by the abolition of those conditions which
lock a woman into the roles of the maker of babies and homes
at the expense of her own progress toward individuality.
At this point it would seem profitable to return to
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H e g e l ’s treatment of the family in the Philosophy of Right
in order to begin making the distinctions between the aspects
of the family that are necessary to the State in terms of
Hegel's concept of the actualization of freedom, and those
features which derive from the ideological foundations of
particular interests.
As the immediate substantiality of mind, Hegel finds
the family specifically characterized by love, which he says
is the mind's feeling of its own unity.

Thus, in a family

the individual is conscious of himself as a member rather
than an independent person.

The right which an individual

enjoys on the strength of family unity, that is the indi
vidual’s life within this unity, takes on the form of right
only when the family begins to dissolve.

At that time, the

family members begin to be self-subsistent persons and re
ceive their ’share’ separately by way of money, food, edu
cational expenses, etc.
phases:

The family is completed in three

1) Marriage, or the form assumed by the concept of

the family in its immediate phase,
Capital

2 ) Family Property and

(the external embodiment of the concept), 3) The

Education of the Children and Dissolution of the Family.
As the immediate type of ethical relationship,
marriage is first of all the moment of physical life, but
through the self-consciousness of marriage,

the natural

sexual union is changed from a merely inward union to a
union on the level of mind, i.e., into self-conscious love.
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Hegel argues that marriage is in essence an ethical tie.
Thus when it is treated only as a sexual relationship m a r 
riage is stripped of its other characteristics.

Similarly

when marriage is thought of as only a civil contract, it is
degraded to the level of a contract for reciprocal use.

And

if marriage is based on love alone it is exposed to every
contingency because love is a feeling, and therefore does not
qualify as ethical life.

Marriage therefore is more precisely

characterized as ethico-legal love and does not include the
transient,

fickle, and purely subjective aspects of love.

Hegel does allow that marriage may have a more obvious sub
jective source in the particular inclinations

of two persons,

but the objective source nevertheless lies in the free con
sent of the persons to renounce their natural and individual
personality to this unity of one with another.

In this sense

marriage is their liberation, he says, because in it they
attain their substantive self-consciousness.

Hegel goes on

to say that our objectively appointed end and therefore our
ethical duty is to enter the "married state," and while the
external origin of any particular marriage is fundamentally
contingent, it mainly depends on the extent to which reflec
tive thought has been developed.
Hegel finds the ethical aspect of marriage specifically
in the individual's consciousness of this unity as their sub
stantive aim, and therefore consisting of their love, trust,
and common sharing of their entire existence as individuals.
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While it begins with a contract, it is peculiarly a contract
to transcend the standpoint of contract from which people
view one another in their individuality as self-subsistent
units.

Furthermore, the identification of personalities

whereby the family becomes one person and its members become
its accidents is the ethical mind, which when considered in
itself apart from a particular circumstance is the ground of
the religious character of marriage and the family.
Hegel is careful to point out that no one facet of
marriage makes up the whole range of its ethical character.
Thus if the wedding ceremony is taken as only an external
formality it is stripped of all significance except as a
civil relation reduced to a mere fiat of civil or ecclesi
astical authority.

As such, the ceremony would appear as

something not merely indifferent to the true nature of m a r 
riage, but actually alien to it.

If marriage is understood

as merely a formal condition which must precede the complete
mutual surrender of the parties to one another, it appears to
"bring disunion into their loving disposition, and like an
1 7

alien intruder, to thwart the inwardness of their union."
Thus, again: the specifically ethical character of marriage
consists in the fact that the consciousness of the parties is
crystallized out of its physical and subjective mode, and is
lifted to the thought of what is substantive.
Hegel does characterize the difference between men
and women as similar to that between animals and plants.
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saying that women are capable of education but are not "made”
for activities demanding a universal faculty such as the more
advanced sciences, philosophy, and certain forms of artistic
production.

One sex he says is mind, the self-consciousness

of conceptual thought and the volition of the final objective
end, while the other is mind maintaining itself in unity as
knowledge and volition of the substantive, but knowledge and
volition in the form of concrete individuality and feeling.
Finally he says that marriage is essentially monogamy
because it is personality, i.e., immediate exclusive indi
viduality, which enters into this tie, and therefore the
truth of this tie can only proceed from the mutual w h o l e 
hearted surrender of this personality.

Personality then,

only attains its right of being conscious of itself in
another to the extent that the other is in this identical
relationship as a person.

Marriage, and especially monogamy,

is therefore one of the absolute principles on which the
ethical life of the community depends.
However, the family as person (atomic individual)
has its real external existence in property; and it is only
when this property takes the form of capital that it becomes
the embodiment of the substantial personality of the family,
Hegel argues that as a universal and enduring person, the
family requires possessions that are specifically determined
as permanent and secure, which is to say it requires capital.
In contrast to the arbitrariness of a single owner's
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particular needs as one abstract moment of property, p a r 
ticular need as well as the selfishness of desire is trans
formed in family property into something ethical, into
labor and care for a common possession.

This capital is

common property, and while no member of the family has
property of his own, each has his right in the common stock.
But this right may come into conflict with the father’s
right of administration because the family is exposed to
partition and contingency.

Finally, property is connected

essentially to the conjugal relation, and only remotely to
the clan or house,

for marriage creates a new family inde

pendent of clans or hous es,
Hegel regards the children of the family as the only
external and objective existence of the unity of marriage.
The children have the right to maintenance and education at
the expense of the family’s common capital, and the rights
of the parents over the wishes of their children is limited
by the object, viz. discipline and education.

The punish

ment of children is not specifically concerned with justice,
but rather with preventing the children from exercising
freedom while still in the toils of nature and with lifting
the universal into their consciousness.

Similarly, the

child's education has the positive aim of instilling ethical
principles into the child in the form of an immediate feel
ing in which differences are not yet explicit, and the nega
tive aim of raising children out of the instinctive physical
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level to self-subsistence and freedom of personality, and so
to the level at which they have the power to leave the natu
ral unity.
Once the children have been educated to freedom of
personality and are capable of holding free property and of
founding families of their own, the original family moves
into its time of ethical dissolution and the question of
inheritance must be dealt with.

The essence of inheritance

in Hegel's view is the transfer of property which is in
principle common to private ownership.

This transfer becomes

increasingly confused as the sense of family unity fades.
The particular danger in Hegel's view at the time of dissolu
tion, either through the father's death or when persons and
families have become so dispersed through civil society as
to have begun to gain self-subsistence, is that a man may
squander his capital or bequeath it to someone outside the
family.

To the extent that the family's capital is an em

bodiment of the family unity however, Hegel regards bequests
to friends as ethically justified only when the friendship
was so close as to approximate the family relationship.
Finally, Hegel suggests that the family disintegrates
essentially and through nature.

In this sense the moments

bound together in the family's unity must be released from
the concept of the ethical idea to self-subsistent objective
reality.

This then is the stage of difference, or the deter

mination of particularity which is related to universality
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but in such a way that universality is its basic principle
though only inward.

The transition from the family to civil

society is the emergence of the particular; the leaving
behind of an undifferentiated universality and the arrival
at the realm of appearance.
Marcuse lists three features of the Hegelian concept
of the family that particularly qualify it for guiding the
individual's development from subjective particularity to
objective universality,
freedom:

i.e., Hegel's sense of authentic

1) It is a direct unification of individuals into

a general community without the person as such being negated.
2) Its real character of general community is constantly in
the individual's awareness.

3) Since the actual communal

nature of needs and interests concern an actual universality
(if limited) they are raised from the sphere of mere selfish
ness and are 'moralized'.
Taken by themselves , these aspects of the family
emphasize the development of a collective or social conscious
ness in the individual that also integrates the notion of
responsibility to, and freedom in the full scope of humanity.
But Marcuse points out that all of these features are only
realized in the specific relationship between family and
property, which is the central focus of all features of the
Hegelian family.

Hegel's concept of the individual as an

existing person is basically that he is a private owner, and
Marcuse quotes Hegel in the Enzyklopadie, the "person only
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becomes merged with himself in property, and only possesses
the ’external sphere of his freedom’ in property.
But even if property is the first embodiment of
freedom, and therefore is a substantive end, Hegel argues
that it would not be possible to realize that actual u n i 
versality which the sociopolitical order must possess for
its authority if the individual remains tied to the
’arbitrariness’ of private property.

Thus individuals must

transcend their selfish and egoistic ends in relation to the
general community in order to facilitate their actual and
objective universal end.

Therefore the Hegelian system re

quires that property maintain itself as property yet shed
its merely egoistic and private character.

The family,

particularly the rights of inheritance of the family, accom
plishes this rather ambivalent task since the family p ro p
erty is owned by the whole family rather than a single
member.

The universality of the property is guaranteed by

means of the limitations on the freedom of bequest, and
being anchored in the family through inheritance for several
generations, property is more or less entrusted to the in
dividual by the general community.

Marcuse suggests that by

making the moralizing and eternalizing of property the spe
cific function of the family, the state is elevated above
the sphere of property insofar as society and the state are
relieved of the task of the primary ’peremptory’ safeguard
ing of property.
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As the social entity for whom the moral evils of pri
vate property pose the least danger, the family in Hegel's
analysis appears as mysteriously impervious to the vicious
effects of social dissension, antagonism, and divisiveness
as any ideological picture of "mother" and the family would
have us believe today.

In both cases the implication is that

somehow the family, as substantial entity, exudes a protective
cloak of lawful, ethical principles which shield each family
member from the immoral chaos, passion, or irrationality of
the greater social environment as long as that family member
remembers familial "piety," executes his familial duties, and
sets about contributing his bit towards fending off the roving
and rootless rabble by starting his own family as soon as p o s 
sible.

Were it possible to consult those women who were at

once expected "to do for" the family and to symbolize the
purity, the love, and the morality of the family, the idea of
the family's natural immunity to the vices of human greed,
abuse, opportunism, and general inhumanity to others might be
found strikingly over-generalized.

To the extent that Hegel's

attempt to transcend the particularity of private property by
entrusting it to the family follows this kind of logic it is
necessary to reconsider whether the moment of universality can
actually be realized if the family is so "burdened" by the
dynamics of private ownership, insofar as private ownership
manifests itself as exclusivity and division among individuals
in civil society along the lines of financial assets.
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In the Manuscripts of 1844 Marx criticizes the con
cept of communism offered by the French Socialists Proudhon,
Fourier, and Saint-Simon as immature and incomplete insofar
as they have not "grasped the positive essence of private
property and just as little the human nature of need."

15

This immature communism, he argues, attempts an historical
proof for itself by referring to disconnected historical
phenomena opposed to private property whereas it is necessary
that the entire revolutionary movement finds its empirical
and theoretical basis in the movement of private property,
which when positively transcended is the real appropriation
of the human essence by and for man.
Because material private property is the "material
perceptible expression of estranged human life," the m ov e
ment of private property,
is ".

i.e., production and consumption,

. . the perceptible revelation of the movement of all

production until now, i.e., the realisation or the reality
of man."^^

The positive transcendence of private property

therefore is the positive transcendence of all estrangement
and the appropriation of human life, and furthermore is the
return of man from a particular mode of production, of which
the family is one, to his human or social mode of existence.
Marx emphasizes that this positive transcendence of
private property cannot be understood as "direct one-sided
gratification" in the sense of "possessing" or "having,"
for it is the appropriation by man of his total essence in
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a total manner,

i.e., as a whole man.

Instead of the im

poverished notion of private property as an object that is
only "ours" when we have it, i.e., when it is used by us,
Marx suggests that each of m a n ’s human relations to the
world, whether of a physical or mental character is, in its
orientation to an object, the appropriation of that object
and the appropriation of the human world.

Thus the trans

cendence of private property is the "complete emancipation
of all human senses and qualities," which allows man to r e 
late to things for the sake of the thing, but with the thing
itself understood as "an objective human relation to itself
and to man, and vice-versa."

17

In this way need or enjoyment

lose their egotistical character and nature loses its char
acter of mere utility by becoming human use.
This phenomenological analysis clarifies the funda
mental contradiction in the concept of private property which
Hegel apparently sought to circumvent by means of the family's
communal ownership to the necessary family capital.

But even

when the family’s capital is pictured as a wholistic estate
protected against dissolution by inheritance laws, Hegel's
attempt to ground exclusive ownership in the sbustantial unity
of the family seems to be only a disclaimer or qualification
of the exclusive rights of private ownership insofar as we
are now dealing with family against family rather than one
independent individual against another.

Ultimately it would

seem that the effect of the family's sense of "having" on a
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developing consciousness would be the same as that of an
individualistic sense of possession, for it is difficult
to imagine how the concept of "ours" as family could be
kept from suggesting the concept of "mine" as individual.
At the same time, it is questionable that the c o n 
cept of "ours" as family can be kept distinct from the con
cept of "ours" as human species.

Again in the Manuscripts,

Marx writes that man is a species being because he adopts
the species as his object in practice and in theory, and
because he treats himself as the actual living species,
i.e., as a universal and therefore free being.

18

The whole

character of a species is contained in the character of its
life-activity which for man is free, conscious activity in
which man's own life is an object for him.^^

Estranged

labor, however, reverses the relationship between a man and
his life-activity so that he makes his life-activity a mere
means to his existence instead of an object of his will.
Private property as the product and the necessary consequence
of estranged labor, as well as the means by which labor
alienates itself therefore institutionalizes the alienation
of truly human, social property, which is essentially the
estrangement of man's species nature from man.
to which this estrangement ".

The extent

. . means that one man is

estranged from the other, as each of them is from man's
essential nature.

. ."

20

underscores the futility of attempt

ing to counteract these effects of private property by means
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of the family, particularly when the family's substantial
bond is manifested in property or as the care and activity
of the family with respect of property.
The contradiction inherent in the family's relation
ship to private property is even more clearly demonstrated
in the case of the woman who is all too often considered a
part of the family property herself, or is regarded as a
servant or caretaker for whom the maintenance of property is
actually a matter of self-fulfillment.

This is, of course,

the relation to the family and its material "substance"
against which many women today most vigorously protest, but
it is significant that this denial is expressed as a demand
to be equally able to realize their individuality by means
of a liberation from attention to family property, i.e.,
duties, etc.

For those women who have realized that their

activity, or labor, for the family is an unfree activity
insofar as it is determined and demanded by family members
who are under no similar obligations, the presence of e s 
tranged labor and its concomitant manifestation as private
property is no surprise.

Ultimately it is the feminist out

cry against the restriction and emptiness

(in the sense of

self-objectification) of the family situation that points
to the failure of the family to counteract the egoism and
estrangement of private property precisely because the
bourgeois family demands that a woman participate in a form
of alienated labor for the production and reproduction of
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the family as determined by the needs of the non-workers, i.e.,
the young who are preparing to leave the family and the man
(usually) whose activity is other than housework and childrearing.

It should be emphasized at this point that the

importance of a w o m a n ’s estrangement from the labor of m ain 
taining a family is directly connected to the concept of the
family as the ’r o o t ’ of society and the subsequent pervasion
of alienated labor as an acceptable and familiar condition.
In this sense, the w o m a n ’s question is basic to the estrange
ment of labor throughout society, making her "gains" in civil
society as the "equal" of her husband obviously flawed insofar
as they too exhibit the features of alienation and exploitation
criticized in the family.
M a r x ’s treatment of private property that we have
been considering primarily deals with its phenomenological
effect upon the individual to whom the concept of species
being becomes increasingly vague and unreal, while the idea
of truly human, social property becomes increasingly idealis
tic.

The problem of private property, however, can be seen

to invade the family from the very moment of its (the fam
ily’s) beginning insofar as marriage is objectified and made
substantial in a relationship to property which is exclusive.
To the extent that marriage and the family are intended to
establish the boundaries between "our" things and "their"
things, and to limit the obligations of "our" cooperative
efforts to the practical,

i.e., commercially expedient.
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scope of this particular family's productive activity, it
is questionable that Hegel's ideal of self-conscious love
is ever realized.

In this sense the concept of marriage

is such that it represents for any two particular members
of civil society an economic union in which a union on the
level of mind is of little consequence.
Contemporary trends point to the degree that marriage
has indeed become identified with a kind of business partner
ship, where the business is to both accumulate capital and
produce heirs for its inheritance, but also point to the fact
that the structure of marriage in bourgeois society actually
has a damaging effect upon the union of minds or selfconscious love.

As the practice of sequential marriage is

becoming more acceptable, many other people refuse to admit
the institution, as ceremony and legality, into the realm of
their relationship in an attempt to clearly differentiate
between their human, emotional bonds and a business agreement.
Both cases evidence to extent to which marriage as a property
arrangement reduces the dimension of human response and feel
ing in the interests of material gain.
Although the processes by which marriage is losing,
or has lost, its ideal character as ethico-legal love properly
demand sociological analysis, the fact that marriage cannot be
simplistically defined as a love relationship with a unique
effect on one's economic concerns is important in working out
the problem of liberating the woman of the family without
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destroying the family, specifically, without destroying its
capacity to engender a consciousness of unity and commonality
among human beings.

Clearly, if it is the family's property

and imposition of estranged labor that can be seen to falsify
the ideal characteristics which would contribute to the a d 
vance of reason towards freedom, it is not the family per se
that must be "abolished," but its limiting and alienating
features.

Particularly as the world becomes increasingly

interdependent and global in scope, the aspects of the family
which have in the past been necessary for its survival, and
therefore for the survival of its members as individuals
(such as its capacity to cooperate as a productive unit apart
from the organization of civil society, and to provide for
most of the needs of its members in a relatively selfsufficient fashion)

should today be given the kind of critical

analysis that would be capable of understanding the family in
a new sense.

Instead of looking for ways in which the family

as economic unit may reassert itself in civil society, it
would seem timely to reconsider the relationships of family
members to the family with respect to human beings' unique
potential for recognizing their species as their essential
being.
In criticizing the French philosophers, Marx observes
that their proposal to replace marriage with the 'community
of women' is simply to make women communal property with the
same aspects of prostitution as is distinctive of the concept
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of "universal" private property.

Marx criticizes this a p 

proach as the expression of infinite degradation in which
man exists for himself.

Instead he argues that the rela

tion of man to woman is the direct, natural, and necessary
relation of person to person, in which m a n ’s relation to
nature is immediately his relation to man, and his relation
to man is immediately his relation to nature.

Furthermore,

he finds in this relationsihp the expression of man's own
progress towards the full realization of his human and
natural essence.
From this relationship one can therefore judge m a n ’s
whole level of development.
From the character of
this relationship follows how much man as a species
b e i ng. as m a n , has come to be himself and to com
prehend himself; the relation of man to woman is
the most natural relation of human being to human
being.
It therefore reveals the extent to which
m a n ’s natural behaviour has become h u m an . or the
extent to which the human essence in him has become
a natural essence--the extent to which his human
nature has come to be natural to him . . . and .
. . man's need has become a human need . . . the
extent to which he in his individual existence is
at the same time a social being.21
Hegel argued that marriage must be monogamous b e 
cause personality only attains its self-consciousness through
consciousness of itself in another, but to the extent that
legal monogamy militates against m a n ’s realization of truly
human behavior by encasing the relationship to man and to
nature in the legal and ideological trappings of ownership
and estranged labor, it is apparent that marriage does not
facilitate the attainment of self-consciousness.

And if

the demands of ownership and estranged labor are such that
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an individual's relationship to another person must be e x 
clusive of all other such relationships, it is apparent that
marriage is not the sort of necessary relationship to nature
conducive to man's developing consciousness of his species
essence, i.e., of his capacity for free conscious activity,
but rather the obstruction to this rational development which
ceases its movement in the essentially accidental relation
ship of two particulars.
Although an emphasis on the nature of a woman's role
in the family is frequently a sign that the "Woman Question"
has been shelved while the more important matter of bringing
about the revolution is discussed, it seems apparent that it
is specifically the conditions of this role in bourgeois
society that inform the particular questions of women's
alienation from civil society and from their own personal
development and being.

To abstract women from the family role

is to suggest that women are only an oppressed minority seek
ing access to the opportunities of civil society as would
any group of oppressed men.

The question is then a matter

which is not peculiar to women, or to a woman's consciousness
insofar as it leaves the individual woman alone to work out
a compromise between private and public life in her own
particular (and alienated) situation.

The significant risk

facing society as a whole is the apparent trend towards just
this sort of compromise insofar as it furthers the perversion
of man's relationship to his life-activity.

Hegel's location
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o£ the family as the Ethical root of the State speaks d i 
rectly to the human need to realize the bonds of mutual
concern and respect in humanity as a whole, and the his 
torical centrality of the woman to the family generates
in her demands for greater opportunity, etc., a universal
concern for the nature of our source of species-consciousness
Nevertheless, Hegel's conception of the family itself is far
too limited to structure the kind of experience that will be
necessary for the realization of genuine human freedom.

It

is particularly in respect to these inadequacies that femi
nist demands gain a universal and revolutionary character.
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^Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. and ed. by T. M.
Knox (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press,
1972), addition #20, p. 234.
^Ibid., p. 36 (par. 33).
^Ibid., p. 142.
^H. Marcuse, "A Study on Authority,” in Studies in
Critical Philosophy, trans. by Joris De Eres (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1972), p. 105.
^Ibid., p. 108.
^Ibid., p. 109.
■7

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected W o r k s .
Vol. 3: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (New
York: International Publishers, 1975), pp. 334-335.
^Ibid., p. 339.
^Ibid.
l^Karl Marx, Collected Works. Vol. 3: Contribution to
the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law (New York: Inter
national Publishers, 1975), p. 180.
l^Ibid., p. 181.
l^ibid., p. 183.
^^Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 113.
^^Marcuse, Studies in Critical Philosophy, p. 106.
^^Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, pp. 296300,
l^Ibid., p. 297.
^^Ibid., p. 300.
l*Ibid., p. 275.
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THE REIFICATION OF SEXUAL BEING:

A DIALECTICAL

APPROACH TO WOMEN'S LIBERATION
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PREFACE

Woman's fight for personal freedom and civil equality
is essentially grounded in the notion that feminity is not a
limiting condition.

Thus the struggle is seeking to prove

that because a woman's physique is generally less suitable
for heavy manual labor, or because of her more immediate and
more demanding relation to the biological reproduction of the
species, a woman is merely sexually distinct but not sexually
inferior.

To a certain extent the feminist argument seems

forced to employ the logic of the mind-body dualism in order
to establish the irrelevance of physical function in matters
of rational, i.e., intellectual and moral, capacity.

In the

words of Plato's argument for the equality of women, anatomi
cal distinction does not imply differences that are relevant
for "our purpose," which in Plato's case is the discrimina
tion between individuals suited for Guardianship and those
suited only for material maintenance of the Republic.
Similarly women today argue that the feminine function in
sexual reproduction does not limit individual function in
human society.
True to the liberal, democratic, and especially
American tradition, the struggle against individual oppres
sion by virtue of group affiliation, or in this case
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physical categorization, initially appears to be a move which
is wholeheartedly in support of self-determination and the
right of individual variance.

Thus the woman who is able to

claim her freedom from the stereotypical roles and activities
of women in general should find her freedom for individual
expression greatly improved.

The logic is straightforward

and direct, moving within the tradition of bourgeois indi
vidualism and the historical expansion of civil rights.
It would be pointless to deny that this logic does in fact
work to the extent that equal opportunity programs and
provisions make it possible for women to gain access to edu
cational or career experiences which inevitably contribute
to anyone's development as an individual.

But it is as

necessary to identify the inherent flaw in the logic of
bourgeois privatism as it affects the women's struggle as
it is to support the struggle in its efforts to break down
(and/or through)

the obstructions to feminine development in

bourgeois society.

There are two major reasons which I find

to press the importance of such an analysis.
First, to the extent that the women's movement is
potentially the most broadly based issue-oriented group on
the political scene today, the well-publicized split between
women who find total personal fulfillment in the home and
those who insist that individual being must include life and
activity outside the home threatens to render the women's
movement as divided and consequently impotent as any past
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attempt to unify a genuinely revolutionary consciousness.
Furthermore, this split can extend beyond the obvious divi
sion between those who assume that the pursuits of children
and education or careers are mutually exclusive, and can r e 
sult in an internal estrangement from one's own capacities
for independent thought and action.

Thus because the alter

native to the bourgeois family and home life is posed as an
active public life subject to all of the qualifications of
success in bourgeois society, those women who, like many
men, find activity and participation in the mainstream of
contemporary society unacceptable, seem to share the senti
ments of women strongly defensive of family and children,
even though they are distinctly independent and selfdetermined individuals.
Second, to the extent that the women's movement
claims for its goal the liberation of human potential, but
structures its struggle according to a formal concept of
equality, it is marked by a reified notion of human being
which cannot account for sexual human being.

Thus the v i c 

tory of the fully equal woman, and the fully legallyendowed woman, is the victory of the woman who appears as
the non-sexual individual.

In this sense, the internal

fragmentation that is required for the utilization of the
"freedom" to engage in market activities by selling one's
labor

power is now repeated, not only by its greater e x 

tension, but by the necessary sacrifice of the sexual
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dimension of personal being required for the full enjoyment
of civil rights.

The crisis of the content of w o m e n ’s libera

tion is thus the crisis of sexual being as essential to in
dividual human being.
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KANTIAN REALITY:

THE INTELLIGIBLE

CONTINGENCY
Kant begins his introduction to the Critique of Pure
Reason with the assertion that all knowledge must begin with
experience.

The human "faculty of knowledge" would be i n 

active, he argues, unless objects affected the senses in such
a way as to (1j produce representations,

(2) arouse the

understanding to compare these representations, and (3) by
combining or separating them, develop the knowledge of o b 
jects which is known as experience.^

The Kantian picture of

human understanding is that of a product of the experiential
given and the conceptual given(s), or of the reality of m a 
terial being and rational perception, the former
cases) being in principle unknowable

(in both

(in a direct sense).

Kant recognized that the determinative force of the structure
of our perceptive faculties had to be analyzed and understood
if the Enlightenment vision of a thoroughly rational and
knowable world was to achieve the status of truth.

Thus for

Kant the crucial question with respect to our empirical
knowledge is that of ".

. . what our own faculty of knowl-

edge . . . supplies from itself."

2

In the first part of the Transcendental Doctrine of
Elements, the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant gives a fairly
concise statement of the primary constituents of human
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understanding.

On the material side of any cognitive e x 

perience stands the object, the worldly given, which is the
source of all thought and yet ultimately unknowable in it
self.

Intuition, as both a property and a capacity,

is the

bridge which issues from the intellectual side of the ex
perience and represents the ultimate limit to the relation
ship between rationality and the world.

Intuitions are

yielded only by sensibility and all thought (as a means of
understanding) is directed to intuition, Kant argues, but the
relationship between knowledge and its object (s) is funda
mentally a process of mediation and intervening steps.

To

the extent that Kant posits the reality of material existence
beyond human understanding he defines appearance as precisely
. . the undetermined object of an empirical intuition. .
but the Kantian use of the term 'appearance'
labeling of the unknown.

is limited to the

Matter resides in appearance and is

subject to perception only "a posteriori," or through the
process of sensation, Kant believes, but this matter has no
determinative force.

In its inaccessibility, the appearance

lacks form and thus has no viable place in the ordered rela
tions which constitute human understanding and consequently
systematic reality.
".

The form of all appearance, Kant argues,

. . must lie ready for the sensations a priori in the mind,

and so must allow of being considered apart from all sensa
tion."^
Kant's analysis of human understanding focuses upon
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reason's inability to make the "leap" towards the synthesis
of definition of an object such that the principles of the
object cannot be deduced from concepts but must be indirectly
surmised by relating concepts to possible experience.^

Kant's

effort to establish a thoroughly systematic rationalism d e 
pended upon the capacity of the system to allow for the deduc
tion of every given aspect from its basic principle.

In his

critical reconsideration of the Kantian analysis, Georg Lukacs
argues that this notion of "intelligible contingency" is not
the recognition of any facticity or content.

Rather it is the

absorption of the given into the system of concepts in such a
way as to produce a "methodically purified world" in which r a 
tional categories are not applied to the real material sub
stratum but to an intelligible subject matter.^

Lukacs iden

tifies this process of absorption as the origin of the "double
tendency" of bourgeois philosophy,

i.e., the origin of the

tendency to acquire an increasing control over the details of
existence at the expense of the concept of existence as a
w h ole .

In many ways, the struggle for woman's liberation ap
pears to be snagged in the confusion of the intelligible sub
ject matter for the real material substratum.

We are, most

of us, very clear about the extent to which femininity cannot
be defined along the lines of traditional feminine helpless
ness, weakness, and dependence in contrast to traditional
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male strength, reliability, and protectiveness.

We are not

at all clear about the nature of femininity, or consequently
masculinity,

in its positive sense, and to the extent that

the mere suggestion of sexual identification appears to
threaten the demand for equal recognition by the legal and
economic institutions of our society, there is little sig
nificant effort being made to achieve some substantial under
standing of the human implications of sexual bifurcation.
Instead the concept of femininity is being more and more
closely associated with the array of Kant's "things-inthemselves," i.e., it is increasingly becoming understood
as an entity fundamentally characterized by given-ness and
separated from human understanding by the same void which
extends between all objects whose origins cannot be accounted
for in terms of systematic rationalism and the concepts which
deliver the whole of human knowledge.

What we have come to

understand about femininity is that biological distinction
of itself does not determine social behavior.

What we have

not begun to understand is the way in which human social b e 
havior depends upon that biological distinction.
It is specifically the dialectics of sexuality
which is immediately threatened by the current tendency to
treat sexuality as a merely recreational concern that
ought not intrude upon the business of making one's mark
upon the world.

This is not, however, to suggest that
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a return to sex stereotyping and the relegation of woman to
the family and strictly domestic concerns is in order.

That

woman's place and function in the bourgeois, patriarchal
family did imprison the total individual in a role whose
virtue it was to be the support and comfort of the "superior"
human being is not in question, nor can there be any doubt
that a relationship bound by so rigid a form is unable to
sponsor the growth and self-realization of the individual.
But to the extent that one's being is only actualized by and
through the activity of becoming, either in mediating inter
action with the world or in immediate relation with other
human beings, there is no real prospect for the liberation
of femininity.

Rather the reduction of the significance of

one's biological identity is an extension of the impulse of
systematic rationalism to dismiss

the given in favor of its

own deductive detail when it becomes expedient

to do so.

Thus

as Lukacs comments with respect to the action understood from
the contemplative stance:
. . . action, in the sense of changing reality, of an
orientation towards the qualitatively essential and
the material substratum, . .
. consists in predict
ing, in calculating as far as
possible the probable
effects of those laws and the subject of the 'action'
takes up a position in which these effects can be
exploited to the best advantage of his own purposes.
. . . on the one hand, the more the whole of reality
is rationalised . . . the more such prediction b e 
comes feasible.
On the other hand, it is no less
evident that the more reality and the attitude of
the subject 'in action' approximate to this type, the
more the subject will be transformed into a recep
tive organ ready to pounce on opportunities created
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by the system of laws and his 'activity* will
narrow itself down to the adoption of a vantage
point from which these laws function in his best
interests. . . J
To the extent that the system has never operated in the best
interests of the independent and self-respecting woman, nor
in the best interests of the compassionate and cooperative
man, its accommodation of women and the ideological promulga
tion of sexless equality must be recognized as a matter of
systematic convenience and not confused for genuine human
liberation.

LAW AS A FORMAL CALCULUS
Although the legal struggle for women's rights is
grounded in and informed by what is referred to as the
essentially human yearning for self-reliance and selfdirection, it is limited by the sense of justice to which
it speaks, i.e., the justice which prevails in a world of
legally buttressed unfreedom.

Here justice is apparently

achieved when women do not find their processes of mediation
in the world and their engagement with other human beings
recapitulating their traditional, repressive role in the
patriarchal family.

Legal justice is expected to be realized

with the creation of the opportunity for the existence of the
independently equal female person by the official recognition
of the sexlessness of labor power, and of the potential root
lessness, i.e., mobility, of the woman who is independent of
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the man.

It can be expected that this recognition will make

it possible for some women to realize the extent of social
integration enjoyed by some men, but it can also be expected
that an official legal recognition of sexual equality will be
manifested as an indiscriminate denial of human sexuality in
the public arena.
The occlusive feature of the legal arbitration of
social relationships is not a unique phenomenon peculiarly
arising with the issue of feminine equality.

Rather it is

the mark of the reified development of law that social rela
tionships must be reduced to those few elements which allow
of prediction,

i.e., which can be counted on to support and

facilitate a particular form of economic production.

Lukacs

locates the origin of the reified development of law in the
period of the bourgeois revolution with the struggle against
the notion of the Divine Right of Kings and hierarchical
privilege.

From the start the fight was the struggle of form

versus content, he argues, rather than a conflict of princi
ples, with the revolutionary class refusing to acknowledge
the validity of a legal relationship which they saw as
existing merely in fact.
At this time, the bourgeois class, in order to fa
cilitate its own ascendency, defied the prevailing order on
the basis of the assumption that the formal equality and
universality of law, as expressed by the concept of natural
law, was able to determine the content of the law actually
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regulating social relationships.

But while the fight to

realize the universal extension of human rights suggested
by natural law was the attempt to ground law in reason and
give it a rational content, the consolidation of bourgeois
law after its first victories was the systematic abandonment
of that rational project.

Bourgeois law had to allow a

wedge to be driven between the formal categories of law and
its factual content in order to guarantee the political and
economic content of its legal institutions and in order to
halt the appeal of the opposition to its perception of the
content of natural law.

Out of this period of victory and

consolidation, Lukacs suggests, law in bourgeois society
gained the specific character of a formal calculus by means
of which the legal consequences of particular actions can be
most accurately determined.
Lukacs argues that the real basis for the development
of law is a change in the power relations between classes, but
that it is just these relations which are the limits of the
closed system of statutes.

To the extent that calculability

is crucial to modern capitalism, it is necessary that the
economic system be surrounded and supported by a system of
justice and an administration which are similarly predictable,
Lukacs points out that the transition from the old capitalist
forms of acquisition to modern capitalism's strictly rational
organization of work on the basis of rational technology
could not have come into being if the dispensing of justice
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had been in any way "capricious."

This need for calculation

was thus the revolutionary bourgeois need for rational systemization and the abandonment of empiricism, tradition, and
material dependence.
It is similarly the contemporary bourgeois need to
discard the forms of human relations which no longer func
tion as an aid for and support of the socioeconomic order but
rather thwart its efficiency and challenge its authority.
In this sense it is the family which becomes an obstacle to
the smooth operation of a system of production which depends
upon the worker who is above all mobile, available, and free
of any real dependents.

It can be shown that capitalist p r o 

duction previously relied upon the nuclear family for the
reproduction of labor power qua labor power, and to some e x 
tent this is still the case:

We have not yet accommodated

the science of "cloneing" or test-tube babies, although the
theory is reputedly within our reach.

But the family’s

vulnerability to the demands of an increasingly inclusive
system of education, entertainment, and recreation is demon
strated both by the virtual disappearance of the extended
family and by the "crisis" of the nuclear family.

Consider

ing the hours a child spends in school, in after-school
activities and lessons, at summer camp, and of course in
front of the television, it is clear that it is not the
family,

i.e., the significant and essentially specific adults

in a ch i l d ’s life which prepares the next generation for their
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stint of labor in the productive processes.

This training

and "conditioning" can be, and is, more efficiently done
through the agencies and institutions of the social system
itself.

Thus the stable family is really of minimal use to

the productive system, five years perhaps at the most, and
poses a proportionally greater problem in its unprofitable
function as the social unit which can nurture and create
truly human relationships.

THE CONTEMPLATIVE STANCE:

REIFICATION

AS A PROCESS
Lukacs defines the essence of rational calculation
as ".

. . the recognition and the inclusion in o n e ’s calcu

lations of the inevitable chain of cause and effect in cer
tain events -- independently of individual

'caprice'."^

The advantage of this rational calculation is that one may
determine what the chain of cause and effect in certain events
should b e , and then arrange one's life to make the most of
it, or one may take advantage of protective devices and p r e 
ventive measures to guarantee the predetermined sequence which
appears most profitable.

Because this approach to the world

is grounded in the assumption that knowable laws govern all
of the events which structure an individual's life and can
therefore make it possible for the individual to achieve his
greatest personal advantage by deferring to the movement of
those laws, Lukacs suggests that it is a contemplative
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posture.

He argues that there is no qualitative difference

in the structure of consciousness between that of the worker
whose behavior is determined by the machine he observes, the
entrepreneur who seeks to employ a particular type of m e 
chanical development, and the technologist who seeks some
form of profit in the appropriation of scientific principles
by technology.

It may be added that the same kind of co n

templative stance is apparent in the individual who attempts
to live up to the ideological picture of "perfect" family
life in all its faddish variations by conscientiously follow
ing the prescription of the latest sex manual, child-raising
manual, or cookbook.

It is significant that family tradi

tion and custom which also directs

(to varying degrees) how

one relates to one's spouse, how the children are raised,
and how and what one eats is distinct in its

nonrational

character insofar as it is not calculated to coincide with
the demands of the greater socioeconomic environment but
finds its identity in standing apart from the world of public
affairs.
But the adoption of a contemplative approach to the
world, wherein one seeks independence through accommodation
does not only divide the individual from the lawfully regu
lated society into which he must by calculation find gainful
entry.

Lukacs finds that the individual develops a contempla

tive attitude toward his own objectified and reified facul
ties such that they are not perceived as organic parts of his
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personality.

Instead, his qualities and abilities are p e r 

ceived as things which he can own and possibly capitalize
upon without the danger of betraying an essentially unified
subjectivity.^^

The extent to which this internal process

of reification is expected and assumed in all human rela
tions is well illustrated by Lukacs* reference to Kant's
description of marriage as

, . the reciprocal use made

by one person of the sexual organs and faculties of
another,"

12

for it is the prevalence of just this perception

of marriage today which most deservedly draws criticism and
calls for negation.
This kind of explicit denial of the whole person
with whom one is engaged in a relationship expresses the
complete rationalization of the world and the self in which
calculation comes to be known as the supreme skill, p r e 
dictability the supreme value, and individual success a
matter of manipulative cunning.

Despite the difficulty of

reaching any agreement on the reality of the feminine es
sence, it is generally agreed that the traditional implica
tions of the descriptive term 'femininity* are those traits
which are opposed to logical and calculating determination.
Intuition, emotional and irrational response, and, above all,
love stand forth as the mark of the quintessential feminine
character.

As Lukacs* analysis of the development of reified

law has show, intuitive decision-making and "emotional" reac
tion to the affairs of bourgeois market activity simply have
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no place in the world of rational economics.

Similarly as

Horkheimer observes with respect to the family’s socializing
function, "If the individual . . .

is to be . .

. habituated

not to despair in the hard world , . . but to face it
courageously, a pitiless lack of consideration for himself
and others must become second nature to h i m , o b v i a t i n g
any possible significance of "love."

The point is that the

dimensions of human being which are traditionally, albeit
questionably, associated with femininity are a liability to
the individual who demands entry into the reified economic
and political world and who intends to achieve some degree
of success in that activity.
To be sure, the correlation of femininity with the
nonrational

virtues is to fall dangerously near to the sin

of begging the question, for it is precisely such myths about
womanhood and its capacities that the w o m e n ’s movement and
Equal Opportunity Programs seek to explode.

Nevertheless,

it is the case that the newly "emancipated" woman will have
to relinquish what shreds of the

nonrational dimension of

human being have been left her by default if she is to accom
plish the integration into the reified world of economic and
political activity which is to be made possible by the "open
ing of doors," etc.

In his book. The Crisis of Psychoanalysis

Erich Fromme describes the precedent set during the French
Revolution for this kind of non-liberating "emancipation."
At that time the theory that "souls have no sex" became a
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significant force in the bourgeois revolution and formed the
basis of the demand for w o m e n ’^s political equality.

But,

Fromme argues, women's equality actually meant that woman
was in her essence the same as man in bourgeois society.
"Emancipation did not mean, therefore, that she was free to
develop her specific, as yet unknown, traits and potentiali
ties; on the contrary, she was being emancipated in order to
become a bourgeois man."^^

Again, it is important to recog

nize that the strategy of the w o m e n ’s movement is determined
by the goal of exposing the fallacies of sexual identity
which restrict an individual to specific sorts of activities
on the basis of their gender.

The contradiction of this

intention to free the individual from the restraints of sex
stereotyping is that in order to prove that she too has the
capacities for efficiency and logic, the woman must separate
those specific aspects out of her total being, just as the
socially acceptable man must, and begin to define herself
totally in terms of them.

Unless she is able to develop a

contemplative attitude toward her own reified faculties,
the extension of economic and political opportunities to
women will only serve to prove the nondialectical concept
of sexual difference which has so far barred the genuine
integration of the feminine into society and which has con
sequently established a firm wedge between the private and
the public along the lines of the irrational versus the
rational.
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Lukacs identifies the novel aspect of modern rational
ism as its claim to the discovery of the principle by which
all material phenomena in both nature and society are c o n 
nected.

Whereas previous formal systems limited their p r e 

dictions and calculations to the specific material of their
focus, modern bourgeois rationalism claims to be the univer
sal method by which to obtain knowledge of the whole of
existence.

It is this claim which undermines the rational

project insofar as the attempt to make rational categories
universally significant collides with the given-ness of
empirical facts.

Furthermore, Lukacs suggests that the at

tempt to make a universal systematization of every given
aspect of experience cannot resolve either the problem of
the whole, or the problem of the ultimate substance of knowl
edge which is necessary for the completion of the system.
Lukacs finds that both of these problems are most clearly and
most functionally resolved in K ant ’s notion of "intelligible
contingency," or the compromise between the ideal of
thorough-going rationality and the irrational given, the
"thing-in-itself."

SEXUAL IDENTITY:

THE

QUESTION OF BEING
It is traditional to think of the relationship b e 
tween men and women as a problem beyond rational solution
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primarily because communication between them is basically
flawed.

The tendency is to mythologize the conflicts and

misunderstandings as a "fact of life" and proceed on the
assumption that men have their sphere of life, women theirs,
and while both are absolutely necessary, communication b e 
tween them is not.

The tension produced by the mutual lack

of understanding of each other adds variety and spice to
life somewhat on the principle of the attraction of opposites,
and it really is not worthwhile to challenge the natural
sexual division of perception.

Actually, this seems to be a

nicely workable arrangement, not only allowing for difference
but glorifying it as well, but for the problematic character
of the unified and ultimately single world and its values.
Events may allow two or more interpretations, but they re
main fundamentally unique or they are shown to be separate
events of a differing time and character.

Thus we agree to

disagree on the grounds of sexual difference at a cost which
is generally either the denial of the importance of that
difference or the denial of the importance of its confronta
tion.
1.

The Platonic Dialectic:

The Logos of Being

In his essay, "On the Problem of the Dialectic,"
Marcuse analyzes the meaning of the dialectic beginning with
its original use by Plato, in order to gain a critical p e r 
spective on its use in contemporary philosophy and in Marxist

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

21

theory and practice.

When the dialectic appears in contem

porary philosophy as a kind of "salve" for the apparent neces
sity of contradiction, Marcuse suggests, it has been misused
as a means to avoid identifying contradictions in the m a 
terial world, much as when the disparity between perceptions
and responses of persons of opposite sex is dismissed as
inevitable and therefore beyond practical concern.

Within

Marxism, a similar tendency to accept that which is contra
dictory in its unresolved state is manifested in the view
that the dialectic is either a "residue of Hegelianism"
which might as well be removed from Marxist theory and prac
tice, or is a practical danger insofar as what is actually
a regressive action might be claimed as a n e c e s s i t y . T h i s
latter situation generally describes the attempt to trivialize
the gaps and holes in communication between the sexes and to
establish either one sex role or the other as the normative
model for all social activities.

Even when such an attempt

involves the denunciation of the oppressive conditions of
women, the tendency to accept a "natural" contradiction in
sexual interaction sustains the value of a single sexual
character which can be only arbitrarily isolated.
Marcuse argues that Plato understood the meaning of
the dialectic in its most fundamental sense, i.e., in terms
of its relation to "true being."

In Plato's work the d i a 

lectic is associated with the highest expression of human
knowledge and belongs to the Greek sense of Logos, both as
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the Logos of being and as the Logos of human discourse which
makes true being "visible."

In the Republic, Marcuse finds

dialectical human discourse referred to as a "power" by means
of which human reason is able to "see" being as it is in
itself, i.e., in "truth," while in the Philebus he notes
P l a to’s opposition to the abuse of the dialectic as simply
an "instrument of cognition" or methodology which everyone
can apply anywhere.

17

The necessary relation between the

dialectical ability and the comprehension of true being does
not suggest that one might expect to find every individual
in some sort of obvious opposition to another individual,
such as woman to man, which automatically reveals the truth
of the individual’s being, for this simplistic application
of the dialectical method does not proceed beyond the appar
ent disparity and unity.
For Plato, true being consists in the unity which is
obscured by the multiplicity of material objects and indi
viduals and thus eludes the grasp of purely empirical reason
ing.

Furthermore, true being is itself dialectical and

therefore requires that the effort to conceptualize what b e 
longs together must be accompanied by the effort to separate
what only appears to be linked together.

Ultimately it is

not the form of opposition which is presented by the world
that represents Plato's sense of the dialectic in relation
to the Logos of being, but rather the rational capacity to
probe beyond that form and confront the tension of opposites

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23

unencumbered by the immediate multiplicity of the world.

In

this sense we may expect to find that masculinity and
femininity have a true unity and a true difference beyond
that which we immediately encounter and yet which are avail
able only to the rational process of making distinctions as
first suggested by the immediate engagement with difference.
In the dialogues following the Republic, Marcuse
finds Plato's conception of the dialectic moving towards
the idea of the being of Being itself.

In the Theatetus,

Plato clearly states that the state of being can only be
understood as a process of becoming, which is the result
of movement, change, and combination with other being, and
that there is no moment of absolutely independent being
about the individual at all.

Marcuse points out that this

unceasing movement and unification must also apply to the
ultimate Ideas which determine being in Plato's epistemology
such that their ideal being is not simply unique and unam
biguous, but is inclusive of multiplication, ambiguity, and
finally coherence.

Coming to terms with the being of being

itself is thus the problem of locating the unity in mu l t i 
plicity while maintaining the multiplicity:

i.e., it is the

problem of comprehending how being achieves being without
interrupting the movement and therefore arbitrarily isolâting what is only an aspect of the movement that is being.

18

My difficulty in coming to terms with the nature of
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sexual being begins with the ambiguity of the particular (or
the many) rather than with that of the one, insofar as it is
the character of femininity and its liberation which is in
question.

Nevertheless, Plato's sense of the dialectic's

ontological dimension in which the main concern is to locate
the one in the many without prohibiting its movement is
instructive.

Plato denies that being is either movement or

permanence, sameness or difference, and insists on something
beyond such oppositional situations.
cuse's conclusion, from Plato,

Instead, it is M a r 

that everything which ex

ists does so by being different from everything else.

It is

clear that this is a crucial determination for the concept
of sexual identity because it squarely confronts the necessity
of contrast.

Whatever we may find femininity to be we cannot

expect to find it in isolation, for it is only in distinction
to that quality of sexuality which is different from it,
masculinity, that femininity achieves a genuinely forceful
presence.
Marcuse refers to Plato's explanation in the Sophist
of the necessary relation between every existing individual
and its specific nonbeing as the point at which the individ
ual is differentiated not only from other individuals but
also from Being i t s e l f . A g a i n

the concept of difference

is central to the identity of the individual for it is the
factor of difference between the individual and its appro
priate nonbeing which distinguishes it from that which is
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neither difference nor sameness (Being).

In this sense, that

which constitutes the individual's other is of fundamental
importance to the individual's identity both for its distinc
tion among individuals and for its distinction as an individ
ual.

Similarly being itself has no sexuality even though it

must suggest sexuality in order to suggest life at all.

The

sexuality of the existing individual however can only be made
to be ambiguous to the extent that the difference between
male and female is obscured and repressed.
For Plato the relation between existing individuals
cannot be other than a dynamic one for the freezing of a p a r 
ticular relation denies the movement of becoming which is
essential to his concept of true being.

As Marcuse finds in

the Philebus, Plato's insight into the dynamism of being is
dominated by the concern for that which has achieved being,
or that being which is unified and yet a plurality.

Plato's

approach to this problem of becoming focuses upon the emer
gence of being from every relationship of being and nonbeing
which must consequently engage in another such relationship.
He suggests a threefold classification of being with which
to account for the various terms of the dialectic of being:
1) the determined,

2) the undetermined, and 3} the

undertermined-being becoming determined being.

It is this

third category which represents the true and essential
being.

20

The dynamic character of this third category

sponds to Plato's sense of the movement, change, and
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multiplicity which "is" being and to understand it requires
the use of dialectical reason.
At the same time Plato's concept of the achievement
of being stresses the potential for unity, permanence, and
sameness which also characterizes being insofar as Plato
believes being must find shape in the flux of its existential
relationships.

Thus it would seem that the relationship

between being and nonbeing is structured by points or moments
of essential unity in which what had been a developing being
is at rest in a certain stage of development.

In this sense,

the contrast that is necessary for the definition of feminin
ity would become unnecessary once the characteristics of
feminine sexuality have achieved a certain self-sufficiency
comparable to the achievement of being.

Indeed, the notion

of the merely incidental nature of sexual contrast tends to
dominate the concept of sexual identity such that one's
sexual being is not understood as dependent upon its appro
priate other.

It is this trivialization of sexual contrast

which leads to a neglect of the dialectical nature of sexual
ity in the question of feminine liberation.
It is, however, the specifically Platonic approach
to the rational dialectic of being which perceives the rela
tion between universal and particular being in the objective
dimension of Logos and concepts.

To the extent that Plato

is concerned with the nature of being in itself, he is con
cerned not with the active achievement of being for itself
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but rather with the achievement that is at least cognitively
static.

Thus it is a temptation to dismiss the dialectic as

merely a necessary method which most closely parallels the
form of the problem of discerning true being, true unity,
amidst the multiplicity and flux of particular being, and
similarly to dismiss the dialectic as merely the most viable
means for picking out the elements of femininity from the
field of sexual characteristics in general.

Such a dis

missal, however, also dismisses the individual for whom being
means the subjective involvement in becoming.

Sexuality is

not a matter of objective decision for the individual for
such objectivity would render it meaningless.

It is rather

in the relation to its nonbeing or significant otherness
that sexuality realizes the meaning of masculinity or femi
ninity, and this is a subjective realization for it is
achieved through essentially subjective relationships.
2.

The Hegelian Dialectic:

Historical Being

Plato's consideration of the completion of the m ean 
ing of the dialectic suggests that becoming accomplishes a
static sense of being expressed by the Logos of being itself
and the objective concepts which are used to understand that
Logos.

To the extent that Plato's major concern with the

dialectic is the process of becoming of being in itself, it
is beyond the influence of the consciousness of the subjective
particular just as the particular sexuality of the individual

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

28

is realized in only the universal sense when it is abstracted
from the subjective dimension of relationships.

Nevertheless,

Plato's sense of the achievement of being insofar as the
process of becoming in its entirety continually resolves into
moments of particular being is what Marcuse locates as the
origin of the insight into the historicity of being.

21

With

Hegel this insight is developed into an understanding of the
essential evolution of all being in which the necessity of
becoming grounds every moment of being in that previous moment
from which it has developed.
The Hegelian effort to retrieve the ontological d i a 
lectic from the dimension of the objective begins with the
conception of philosophy as that which establishes itself in
a processual fashion, first by creating its own moments and
then by passing through all of them.

In the Phenomenology

of M i n d , Marcuse finds that H e g e l ’s sense of this dialectical
movement is that it is the "truth" of philosophy insofar as
".

. . its very concept (the concept of philosophy)

its existence."

22

implies

The dialectical method is the real dimen

sion of the method of philosophy for Hegel because it is able
to comprehend each moment of being as a result of a becoming
which reflects the nature of the totality of being.

Specifi

cally, the dialectical method is able to free all being from
its apparent rigidity and isolation, much as it is able to
penetrate the multiplicity for Plato, but then for Hegel is
able to consider being in its true essence by comprehending
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the evolutionary movement of the whole into a new and
"higher" being.

Marcuse emphasizes that this is a sense

of the necessity of becoming in which the real dimension of
each being is determined by that from which it has developed.
Thus being itself is the origin and the basis of the di a
lectic for Hegel, rather than the dialectic being simply a
means of knowing or grasping

the meaning of being by a

cognitive subject.
Hegel's insight into the historicity of the dialectic
suggests a process of development which cannot be abstracted
from the individual in which it is realized, such as is sugfested by the notion of an objective scheme according to which
individuals will be found to conform.

Typically, the growth

and development of an individual's sexuality tends to be r e 
garded as just such an objective process, with one's tastes
and abilities developing according to the statement of one's
genitals despite one's experiences or lack of experiences and
their effect on one's sense of self.

A similar attitude

toward the nature of one's sexual being and its transcendent
ability to become established and sustain the self indepen
dently of one's interactions with other persons appears to
inform the critical and practical attempts to overcome sexual
oppression insofar as those attempts seek to minimize the
consideration of sexual difference in a world where the p r o 
ductive processes move farther and farther away from the
sense of a natural division of labor.

Hegel's concept of
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the individual as the embodiment of the origin of which it
is also the result is particularly instructive in its asser
tion of the significance of the ground of one*s being.

This

can only lie in that from which one has developed, for genuine
and necessary sexual identity must be the result of subjective
dialectical sexual development.

Thus it becomes important to

question the nature of sexual distinction for which any real
and present recognition of sexual difference is seen either
as a threat or a potential threat to the supposedly nonsexual dimensions of the individual.
H e g el’s analysis of the subjective character of h i s 
torical being also raises the question of the relation of
sexual identity to o n e ’s full sense of individual or personal
being, for if o n e ’s sexual identity is merely a bit of
attached data to be used or ignored at will, there is clearly
no fundamental violence done to the individual when sexual
differentiation is obscured.

If, on the other hand, sexual

identity in some sense grounds and informs the whole of indi
vidual being, not only in terms of shaping and developing
o n e ’s responses to the world, but also in terms of its con
stitutive force with respect to the totality of being, the
eradication of genuinely sexual distinction from the arena
of human engagement and activity threatens both a reduction
of individual being and a repression of human being itself.
In this sense it is the individual which is the substance of
the essential being of being, or as Marcuse finds it in the
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Phenomenology of M i n d , it is the substance of the individual
mind, the subject, which undertakes the "tremendous labour
of world history" by giving shape to the whole of the potential content of the universal mind.

23

To the extent that the philosophical method, i.e.,
the dialectical method, is indeed able to consider the nature
of the totality by means of the conprehension of the particu
lar being, it is the task of philosophy to question the
nature of sexual distinction not only in terms of its reified
and nondialectical imposition, but also in terms of its h i s 
torical perseverance which Hegel suggests is an evolutionary
process towards a "higher" and ultimately free being.

It

appears possible of course to reduce this historical pervasive
ness to the necessity of biological determination, but such a
reduction forfeits any capacity to deal with the specifically
human nature of sexuality insofar as it reduces sexuality to
a phenomenon so broad in scope that it includes far more than
animals but anything which lives at all.

The biological basis

of sexuality is not in question, nor does it figure signifi
cantly in the self-consciousness of Hegel's concept of the
universal mind, but the true and fully free realization of
human sexuality towards which the individual processes of b e 
coming are directed is a dimension of self-consciousness w i t h 
out which a realization of the total sense of human being
would be incomplete.

Thus we may return to Hegel’s sense of

the self-understanding of the individual mind as necessary
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for the self-understanding of the universal mind and reassert
the twofold nature of the philosophical task which arises with
the determination to take action against the outrage of sexual
oppression.

If sexual discrimination in the matter of indi

vidual becoming is repressive and arbitrary, the denial of
human sexuality as it is developed in and by the differentia
tion of individual being is repressive and arbitrary as well.
Marcuse argues that Hegel's concept of the historical
dialectic is grounded in the concept of being as "self identi
fication in other b e i n g . A s

developed in the Phenomenology

of M i n d , this concept of being includes both the essential
movement of all being and the oneness and sameness that allows
for the cognitive subject who is able to conceptualize and
claim his own identity.

In this sense, the self-preservation

of being throughout the various contradictions of its m o v e 
ment,

i.e., throughout its encounters with other being and

with its own nonbeing,

is the subjective development which

ultimately creates that which Being (not individual being)
really is.

The subjective development is thus distinctive

of a particular individual for whom relation to another in
dividual does not bring the movement of this development to
a pause or halt but rather gives it articulation through the
"contradiction" of its own movement in its contrast to that
of the other.

This relation to other being is a moment of

unity which must encompass fundamentally diverse and indi
vidual beings in such a way as to preserve the identity of
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the minds or consciousnesses for whom the unity brings in
dividual definition.

Unity is not in this sense, any more

than it can really be in the expression of sexual love, the
submergence of the individual into a "whole" of a separate
and novel identity, for to the extent that it is a moment
in which self-identification in other being is achieved, this
unity is itself only the result of the active becoming of two
separate individuals.
Furthermore, this unity is an essential moment in the
expression and realization of individuality for it is the
moment in which the movement that defines individuality is
preserved precisely in the affirmation of the union, the
moment in which the identity of the individual cannot be in
doubt because it is by means of that identity that the union
is achieved.

The intimate and psychologically profound rela

tionship of sexual love must be the archetypical moment of
union between two individuals, for it is in this relationship
that difference is immediately understood as both the source
and the scope of joy.

This difference however, is that di f

ferentness which is essential to individual being and is no
more a matter of simplistic physical categorization than it
is a matter of disagreement over daily routine.

Rather it

is the differentness which is the result of a particular in
dividual's becoming, or that differentness which grounds and
informs the unique identity of the individual.

It is in

coincidences with this essential differentness that the
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historical dialectic of the individual's development achieves,
in Hegel's terminology, "self-identification in otherness,"
or as Marcuse puts it, it is through the concretely subjective
involvement in which one affects and is affected by others
that individual being
a self."

25

. . receives itself and behaves as

Sexual love, as the subjective relationship of

individual human sensuality, both physical and mental,

is

thus the moment which can preserve the diversity of individ
ual being in the unity which binds two individuals together.
But in its reified expression as a legal or merely customary
contract it is as removed from the preservation of diversity
as it is from the realization of what is in Hegelian terms
the self-understanding of the universal mind.
3.

The Marxian Critique:

The Task of Historical Realization

Hegel's insight into the historical dialectic achieves
its greatest force at the level of theoretical construction.
If we accept, and consequently undertake, the aphoristic
Hegelian motto:

"The real is the rational and the rational

is the real," the development of human sexuality and sexual
difference can be understood as a necessary condition for
human freedom.

But Hegelian idealism, despite its historical

emphasis, only provides for an understanding of that develop
ment as a total, and completed system.

From the perspective

of a single, finite, and above all particular human existence,
i.e., that of the historical subject, the Hegelian articulation
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of human development appears to suggest a degree of evolu
tionary inevitability which could easily justify the suppres
sion of critical thought and action.

For Marx, the necessity

of countering the Hegelian exaggeration of universal human
being was as clear as the necessity of preserving and employ
ing Hegel's dialectical method;
But because Hegel has conceived the negation of the
negation, from the point of view of the positive
relation inherent in it, as the true and only p os i 
tive, and from the point of view of the negative of
all being, he has only found the abstract, logical.
speculative expression for the movement of history,
which is not yet the real history of man as a given
subject, but only the act of creation, the history
of the origin of man.25

The task of history, therefore, once the world b e 
yond the truth has disappeared, is to establish the
truth of this w o r l d . The immediate task of
philosophy, which is at the service of history,
once the holy form of human self-estrangement has
been unmasked, is to unmask self-estrangement in
its unholy forms. Thus the criticism of heaven
turns into the criticism of the earth, the criti
cism of religion into the criticism of law and
the criticism of theology into the criticism of
politics .27
As the most basic form of human difference, the con
cept of sexual distinction is at once the most and least
clear, the most and least simple, for the reality of sexual
identity consistently eludes categorization and definition.
As a foundational aspect of social human being, human sex
uality is still not only an "unholy form of human self
estrangement," but a means and a source of human (both male
and female) victimization for we persist in social
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relationships that assume an adequate understanding of sexual
being in the face of conscious ignorance.

Indeed, the tradi

tional exemption of sexual being from the dimension of human
advancement still casts a shadow over the legitimacy of a
philosophical enquiry into human sexuality, even though it
is precisely the notion of sexuality as a self-evident, nondevelopmental given that binds sexual expression to experience
of complication, guilt, hate, and fear.
At this point the concepts of masculinity and femininity
represent an historical form of oppression which, unless or
until it is overcome, denies the realization of human history.
Nevertheless,

it is by means of the recognition of the m a 

terial basis of these concepts that human development must
progress.

As the real historical subject who understands

the potential of the historical dialectic and yet claims it
for his own, the individual may thus profitably turn to Marx's
analysis of human sensuality as an outline of the necessary
elements of a genuine and free human sexuality.
HUMAN SENSUALITY:

THE PROCESS OF

DIALECTICAL DEVELOPMENT
In the third of his 1844 Manuscripts, Marx writes:
All history is the history of preparing and develop
ing "man" to become the object of sensuous conscious ness, and turning the requirements of "man as man"
into his n e e d s . 2 °
History, he says, is a real part of natural history, and u l ti
mately natural science will be one with the science of man.
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The basis of this prediction is Marx's sense of the essen
tial humanness of man's sense perception, not as the appro
priation of "non-human" nature by the human perceiver, but
because immediate, sensuous nature is for man human sensuousness.

Man is the immediate object of natural science because

it is only in the form of the "other man" that sensuous
nature is present to him in its unmediated, natural being.
On the other hand, nature is the immediate object of the
science of man because man is nature and can only achieve
self-understanding with respect to his sensuous powers in
the science of the natural world.

What Marx suggests is

that human sensuousness is the means by which both man and
nature must be understood for because man finds the material
for his objectification and therefore realizes his own con
sciousness in nature, the nature which develops in human h i s 
tory is man's real nature.
Marx's analysis is of course particularly concerned
with the extent to which the human aspect of nature exists
only for social man thus necessitating the abolition of pr i
vate property.

While nature should exist as the bond between

men in which each of one's human relations to the world,
i.e., seeing, hearing, thinking, loving, etc., is the appro
priation of human reality in its orientation to the object,
private property is the expression of the fact that man's
objectification is also the alienation of himself.

Instead

of the realization of human nature, which is the realization
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of all the physical and mental senses, Marx finds that the
sense of having, of direct possession, which is central to
the concept of private property, estranges the senses by
reducing man's engagement with nature to the dimension of
use and, ultimately, capital.

The abolition of private

property is thus the emancipation of all human sense

and

qualities such that the senses become "theoreticians" in
their practice,

i.e., that the senses become as able to

discern the distinctions in the object of sensual compre
hension as the trained mind is able to make distinctions
with respect to the object of its theoretical comprehension.
In the same way that Plato understood dialectical human
discourse as a "power" enabling human reason to comprehend
true being, Marx suggests that truly human sense perception
is a power which, when able to discriminate between its
"crude," generalized object and its aestheticized and par
ticular object, is able to understand the "truth" of its
human nature.

Thus the indiscriminate sexual relationship,

as a most appropriate example of an only incidentally human
relationship, represents a preemptive concern with the physi
cal function even when it assumes a Casanova style of adoring
appreciation for Love in general. Women in general, or Men in
general.

To the extent that the relationship merely satisfies

the general capacity of the individual, it aborts the theoreti
cal character of an essential social relation through which
two individuals might objectify, and thereby realize, them
selves.
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When the senses become "theoreticians" in their prac
tice, Marx argues, their object is transposed into the objective human relation both to itself and to man.

2Q

In this

sense the nature of the object of human sense perception for
the social man is not limited by the use to which it can be
put in the exclusively human world, although the human rela
tion which it must come to objectify has constitutive force.
At first blush it might appear that Marx is suggesting a
sophisticated but nonetheless "mystical" relationship between
man and nature such that nature is what we perceive it to be
with practical considerations merely illusory.

But Marx

particularly emphasizes the extent to which man is the object
of natural science because it is in nature and through m a n ’s
sensuous activity that man realizes or objectifies his own
being.

He refers to the history of industry as the "open

book of man's essential powers" and defines industry as the
actual, historical relationship of nature to man even though
he understands the development of nature in human history
through industry as its estranged form of development.^^
Despite its dehumanizing effect, industry as the practical
medium by means of which m a n ’s understanding of nature has
transformed human life and prepared human emancipation is
the foremost expression of the centrality of m a n ’s selfobjectification in nature, i.e., it is the expression of
the centrality of his sensuous human relations to the achieve
ment of truly human life.
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To the extent that human sexuality describes the
immediate relation of man and woman, it is the expression
of human sensuality in which nature for the individual is
the human essence.
relationship that

For Marx it is in this natural species. . man's relation to nature is im

mediately his relation to man.

. ." and that man's social

development is most clearly perceived.

31

In this sense,

one human being's need for another is the expression of the
social being of the individual who realizes his sensuous
"power" through a natural but distinctively social relation.
But it is necessary to see in Marx's beautiful phrasing the
ideal of a sexual relationship which while not beyond human
experience,

is certainly dependent upon the human develop

ment and realization of sexuality.

One of the most signifi

cant insights of feminist theory is that which penetrates the
guise of protection and concern which masks a fundamental
inability to develop such a relation except through domina
tion and possession.

Actions which seek to expose and destroy

those conditions which support the reduction of human sexuality
to the typical one-sided appropriation associated with p r i 
vate property (in Marx's terms, the sense that an object is
only "ours" when we "have" it, when it is used by us)

32

are

therefore potentially liberating for human nature, at least
in their conception.

But to the extent that the institution

of private property has had an equally dehumanizing effect
on all of the human senses this is an insight which must
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radically transform all of human sexuality, just as the
emancipation of all human sense must be thorough,

in order

for need or enjoyment to lose its egotistical character and
in order for nature to become truly human nature.
Marx writes that when the objective world becomes
the world of man's essential powers all objects will conform
and realize man himself, and man himself will become the
object.

33

He suggests that a radically social society is

one in which the need and enjoyment of other men will be
also the individual's appropriation, and in which the in
dividual's activity with others will become an organ for
expressing one's own life and a mode for appropriating human
life.

In the subjective aspect of sensuality, he suggests,

the senses of the social man are essentially different from
those of the nonsocial man because the full richness of su b
jective human sensibility can only be achieved through the
objectively unfolded richness of man's essential being.

Thus

the sense object can only be the confirmation of an individ
ual's essential power if that power has been developed by and
through the experience in such a way as to seek out and re
spond to that object.

Only music can awaken the sense of

music, Marx points out, and yet only the man with a musical
ear can appreciate beautiful music.

Similarly, the starving

man is only concerned with the abstract existence of food,
not with its human form.

Marx does not identify it but it

is clear that human sexuality is susceptible to the same
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kind of impoverished and abstract existence if the power of
sexual response is crippled by appropriation of the objecti
fication of the human essence.
Marx does say that this objectification of the human
essence is required, both in its theoretical and practical
aspect, to make m a n ’s sense human and to create the human
sense corresponding to the full wealth of human and natural
substance.It

is this sense of the evolution of human

sensuality which must inform the dialectics of human sex 
uality insofar as the liberation of sexuality in general,
and femininity and masculinity in particular, must create
the conditions for the realization of the human essence in
the sexual relationship.

When the struggle for liberation

makes the demand for conditions which militate against the
expression of sexuality in order to free the individual it
is urgently necessary to distinguish the arbitrary sexist
notion of proper sexual roles from the expression of human
sexuality through which human sense is created and men and
women's sense is made human.

While the diversity of human

individuality makes the definition of the individual accord
ing to group characteristics patently absurd, the extent to
which man is a sensual being who realizes himself in nature
and for whom the sexual relationship is his most immediate
social relation implies the falsity of denying the essential
sexual being.

Thus, to define a woman only in terms of her

husband and family ignores and represses her individual

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

43

identity.

But to renounce any and all commitments between

the sexes because they seem to have no possibilities other
than the patriarchal form is not only to ignore the primary
source of self-realization but is also to substitute an
equally oppressive definition of the self, i.e., that of the
private individual for whom human exchange and intercourse
must always be a measurable compromise.
are not abstractly sexual beings,

Because human beings

except by virtue of their

estranged and alienated sensuality,

it is specifically one's

femininity or masculinity which must be realized if the re
lationship truly objectifies man's essence.
THE PROMISE OF THE DIALECTIC:
HUMAN SPECIES BEING

In the first of the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx defines
man as a species being because, as he puts it,

. . man

. . . treats himself as the actual, living species; because
he treats himself as a universal and therefore free oeing."

35

Man's particular distinction from animals, he says, is that
whereas the animal is immediately one with its life activity,
man is able to make his life activity the object of his will
and his consciousness.

While animals do produce, they can

only produce what they immediately need and each animal's
product belongs immediately to its physical body.

Man h o w 

ever produces even when he is free from physical need and,
Marx suggests, only truly produces in this state of freedom.
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Man is able to confront his product freely, i.e., he does
not have to immediately involve it in his physical being,
and man can produce in accordance with the laws of beauty.
All of these aspects of man's productive life demonstrate
his species-being insofar as they express the whole charac
ter of the species.

The object of man's labor is thus the

objectification of man's species-life.

Its estrangement

from him is an appropriation of his real objectivity as a
member of the species.

In the process human species-con-

sciousness is reduced to a concept of the means to physical
existence.
Furthermore, the estrangement of man from his life
activity is the estrangement of man from man.

When man

confronts himself in the objectification of his species-life,
he also confronts the other man, for it is man's essential
nature, man's universal being, which is objectified in that
product.

In this sense, the degradation of man's spontane

ous free activity to a means alienates all men from their
essential nature, i.e., their species-being, and consequently
limits the life of the species to the concept of the means
for an individual life.^^
To the extent that man's natural species relation
ship is the "direct, natural, and necessary relation of per77

son to person," and, for Marx, the relation of man to woman,
the categorization of man's sexual being as a mode of appear
ance subject to the scheduling of the business world stands
out as a further alienation of man's species activity.
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this case, however, it is not the material product of the
activity which is initially appropriated and presented to
the individual as an alien, nonsocial thing, i.e., as a
commodity, in the manner that the products of labor are.
Rather it is the case that a dimension of human being is
presented to the individual as an expendable and negligible
aspect of facticity which can be overcome through the
sophisticated application of rational definition, i.e.,
through the internalization of a reified understanding of
the apparently disparate elements of human being.

Thus the

tendency to insist on the nonsexual recognition of all
human beings can be seen to intensify m a n ’s estrangement from
man, not as a direct appropriation of a product, but rather
by straining the most natural and direct relationship through
intimations of an inevitable oppression and abuse which will
result.

The appropriation is executed at this level by means

of the perpetration of the sense that the direct man-woman
relationship is only infrequently compatible with the freedom
of the individual, and that the sophisticated human being c a n 
not allow himself the involvement of a natural speciesrelationship lest he in some way sacrifice his personal self.
CONCLUSION
The Marxian concept of man's species-being is central
to the radical nature of the determination to develop the
theoretical capacity of human sexuality, for it is this concept
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which asserts the necessity of the social realization of
human being for the possibility of individual human freedom.
Women cannot expect to fulfill their own unique and essen
tially feminine potentials by simply denying that the sexual
identity with which they are born has any relevance to their
lives as modern, twentieth-century, technologically-adjusted
individuals.

To opt either for the demand that femininity is

of no importance to the qualifications for the traditionally
masculine pursuits or for the assertion that masculine and
feminine qualities are interchangeable, existing in rela
tively equal proportions in a standard, universal human
psyche, is to reduce the women's struggle to the plaintive
appeal of yet another "outgroup" wanting to be let "in."
If women, by virtue of their femininity, have a genuinely
unique and as yet undeveloped contribution to make to the
evolutionary process of the self-understanding of being
itself, and thereby to the process of the evolution of human
nature,

it is imperative that the nature of femininity at

least be preserved until it is understood.

The necessity of

this conservation is underscored by the dialectical nature
of all being which implies that masculinity too is confront
ing a fundamental struggle for liberation from its rigid
antithetical stigmatization vis-a-vis the feminine.

In

short, it is the whole, i.e., the unity, and the "truth,"
of human sexuality and consequently the universal character
of human being which is in question.

If it has been held

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47

in a dehumanizing bondage by the form of the patriarchal
family,

it must find its liberation in the content of the

essentially human, sexual, species-activity.
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INDIVIDUALITY:

A CASE FOR

FAMILY UNITY
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PREFACE

In the first paper, "Women and the Family: A Case
of False Universality," we have been able to examine the
idea of the family in terms of its essential relation to
civil society.

By following Hegel's formulation of the

family as the ethical root of the state we have seen that
despite its subjective and particularistic appearance, the
family is not conceptually complete until its relationship
to the society which surrounds it is defined.

For Hegel the

family is the natural source of ethical human behavior b e 
cause it exists as a single entity which does not, because
it cannot naturally, act against itself.

Against Hegelian

idealism, however, the concrete nuclear family appears too
often to be a sorry contortion of neglected possibilities
and a misunderstood identity.

As was shown in the first

paper, woman's subordinate role in the family vitiates the
experience of human universality thereby systematizing the
acceptance of the exploitation of woman's more immediate
involvement with sexual reproduction.
Woman's oppression by the traditional family struc
ture is currently understood from the point of view of a
sexless individual for whom the opportunities of civil
society seem unjustly remote and inaccessible.

The argument
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of the second paper, "The Reification of Sexual Being," asserts
that masculinity or femininity (one's sexual identity) has an
essential relationship to one's individual being and there
fore cannot be shunted aside in an emancipatory theory of
individuality.

In this paper the primary concern was to lo

cate the nature of sexual being in its dialectical relation
ship to its sexual opposite in order to reveal the false
concept of liberation which pervades the Woman's Liberation
Movement.

While many of the movement's accomplishments are

important and necessary reforms, I believe it is equally neces
sary to recognize that the concern for personal realization,
particular rights and individual freedom is the standard
justification for the isolated individual life and the atomis
tic character of modern society.

In the absence of both an

understanding of and an appreciation of the social foundation
of human being, which is epitomized by the sexual relationship,
the Woman's Movement actually tends to contribute to the intensi
fication of the modern alienated consciousness by insisting
that sexual identity be reduced to an accidental aspect of the
fully public individual.
The sexual relationship is central to the concept of
the family, in all of its possible variations, for it is
through the experience of this intimate human relationship
that the conscious substitution of "we" for "me" occurs.
Today the family is being so severely scrutinized for its
repressive relationship to the individual that its unique
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capacity for transforming the egotistical concern for the
self into a radically social concern is not simply overlooked
but forgotten.

As we seek to reform the bourgeois family by

ridding it of its arbitrary power relationships and oppres
sive demands upon certain of its members
male)

(both male and fe

it is crucial that we do not obliterate the most

natural social grouping and with it the perception of social
relationships as integral to individual identity.

Should

our idea of the family succumb to the antisocial insistence
that the individual's freedom is defined by the absence of
social ties and obligations, it is my contention that the
experience of individual human freedom itself will no longer
be a real possibility.
To the extent that we have accepted the idea of social
existence as a self-imposed restriction of original rights
and freedoms, it is difficult for us to make sense of the idea
of any natural and necessary relationship which would shift
the emphasis from the single individual to two or more indi
viduals determined to succeed in a cooperative effort.

It

is a most significant reflection of the misunderstood nature
of a communal experience that we tend to identify the family
with the legal "possession" of another person and miscellane
ous accompanying (physical) property.

But this misperception,

or blindness, with respect to the family, is the result of a
specific historical development in which the reduction of the
extended family to the present nuclear family is blatantly
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paralleled by the development of political,economic,social,
and psychological egoism.
Today the family's foundational relationship to
human society has been put into question by the capacity of
modern technological society to substitute disparate and
fragmented institutional experiences for the myriad of d e 
velopmental experiences which occur with spontaneity in the
organically unified family.

By allowing institutions to move

into the vacuum of parental authority and by allowing the
real material expression of a unified human will to atrophy,
I believe we tacitly agree to an appropriation of the means
for the realization of human being.

We have a precedent for

this particular form of appropriation of humanity in our
American history.

The monstrous system of black slavery r e 

quired, as a part of its violent foundation, the complete
violation of the black family and social structure.

Indeed,

while the circumstances may be historically altered, the
horrors of both slavery and the slave mentality are,

I be

lieve, the very real implications of the total disappearance
of the family.
My first paper sought to understand Hegel's provoca
tive idea of the universality of the family.

My second

paper attempts to demonstrate that all features of human
being can only be realized in dialectical human interaction.
My third paper must now move towards a theory of the family
which will incorporate the essential dialectic

of human
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being in an experience of genuine universality.

It is my

intention to show that the family may be understood as a
social institution with the potential for revolutionary
praxis, because its essential nature as defined by Hegel is
also the essence of human solidarity.
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FREEDOM IN NAME ALONE
We live today in a society whose ultimate justifica
tion is the protection of individual rights and freedoms but
which is distinctively marked at the subjective level by the
pervasive doubt that a meaningful identity is even possible.
While the contradiction, whether recognized or unrecognized,
is the source of an intense frustration and anxiety, particu
larly when ignited by the pressures to achieve self-reliance
and individual efficacy, the doubt itself drives the m a 
chinery of open-ended, irrational consumption.

The concept

of individuality abstracted from the material circumstances
which are its only real foundation, has become the expression
of a raw dissatisfaction with what appears to be the primary
limitation upon personal activity:
and/or productive inadequacy.

financial incapacitation

But the network of social-

economic-political relationships has as little interest in
promoting the development of genuine human

individuality as

General Motors has

in

producing a car that will last beyond

the guarantee, for

it

is the

desperate belief that identity

and uniqueness can

be

bought

that sustains the solid mass

of consumers who can be talked into buying anything.
It is only in the context which expects, appreciates,
and sponsors individuality that the concept of individual
freedom can be prevented from disappearing behind its

6
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ideological formulation as a kind of self-evident condition
to which human beings somehow "naturally” aspire.

As indi

viduals find themselves increasingly losing any clear sense
of self (as evidenced by the phenomenal sales of "Do-ItYourself Self-Repair" books) our society displays an in
creasingly authoritarian control of the possibilities of
human growth.

The contradiction is most apparent in the

clash of the premium placed on the opportunities for personal
development with the discredited notions of meaning and p u r 
pose.

The prevalent sense of "purpose" today is, by and

large, a concept of personal success as measured by the e s 
tablished and immediate categories of money and power.

A

position of power and authority in the economic-political
structure of society delivers a field of practical affairs
whose manipulation and management can, in the absence of a
critical perception of their artificial character, describe
a particular individual by identifying his functions.

At

the same time a deliberate attempt to express the humanistic
response to those same practical affairs can be used as a
proof of "independent" thought depending upon the current
receptivity towards a manipulation of the "abstract" con
cepts of humanity, nature, and ideological noninterference.
Both approaches are characterized by an attempt to appro
priate an identity by assuming the attitude and posture which
links one to a particular social function.
To the extent that such a function is stabilized by
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practices and institutions that are beyond the direct influ
ence of the individual it is the requirements of the position
which determine the relationships being actively carried out
by the individual whose personality absorbs and embodies the
particular function.
view" or interest,
as

Responding as a particular "point of
whose actual existence is regarded

proof of the social capacity to tolerate personal

difference, the individual cannot transcend the perspective
of the position he occupies without resigning the attendant
distinction it confers upon him for the "position" itself is
structurally unable to grow.

The personal distinction he

enjoys as he gives life to the nonliving but rational institu
tionalization of human debate is a costume at base, appro
priate to a certain set of circumstances, a certain staging
and no other, insofar as the authority with which one is
able to direct or analyze the events of one time and space
is a derivation of the established structure of social p r o 
cesses .
An expanse of human possibility which can only become
a part of the human experience through individual becoming
remains unexplored and thus unrealized.

The extent to which

the capacity to scan one's personal horizon of possibilities
is diverted into the systematically encouraged emphasis upon
the rights of an empty individuality is the measure of our
loss of personal freedom for it is the evidence of the shallow
ness with which human potential is perceived.

When the theory
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of individual freedom is excused from the responsibility of
facilitating the realization of human difference, whether on
the grounds that toleration is sufficient or that toleration
exhausts the proper range of social involvement, the theory
is severed from its true ground, the concrete processes of
human becoming.

Individuality, as a concept, as an ideal,

and as a genuine human need,

is first reduced to an equiva

lency with general human activities and then is gutted.
Instead of invoking the wonder of infinite human potential
the word itself is used only when the implications of quali
tative human difference can be ignored: When the prospect
of individual expression harbors no real surprise vis-a-vis
the established order of things.
THE MEANING OF "INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM"
In his essay "Democratic Theory:

Ontology and Tech

nology," C. B. Macpherson develops the argument that Western
democracy, as distinct from the communist theory of democ
racy or populist democracy, ".

. .is

for market society. . ."^

The emphasis upon individual freedom of choice which struc
tures Western democratic theory, he argues, significantly ex
ceeds the right to a choice between political parties.

The

individual's right to free choice in Western theory includes
the rights to a choice concerning the use of one's income,
one's capital, and one's skills and energy.

On the other

hand, the liberal market system (capitalist economics)
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requires that one enter voluntary contractual exchanges of
one's person and/or property which ultimately violate the
individual's right of autonomy.

But the premise that the

human individual is fundamentally motivated by the rational
desire to maximize his utilities, both as material goods
and as (relatively)

immaterial pleasures, provides a theo

retical justification for an economic system which must
force the individual into a position that denies selfdirection and a functional reconciliation with the principle
of the absolute priority of individual autonomy.

Further

more, Macpherson argues, it was necessary that an incentive
to continuous exertion on the part of the individual be
institutionalized insofar as the traditional, feudal obliga
tion to work was defused by capitalist market arrangements.
That incentive was achieved with the ideological entrench
ment of the concept of a right of unlimited individual appro
priation which found its moral justification in the new postu
late of human nature peculiar to modern liberal market society,
viz. that it is man's nature to seek satisfaction of unlimited
desires both innate and acquired.

2

For Macpherson this ontological assumption declares
a degree of individualism that is still the ideological
foundation of our system of production insofar as that system
relies upon market incentives, and it is clearly the case that
the picture of unrestricted appropriation

exerts tremendous

appeal for the majority of citizens who share the conceptual
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constructs of Western democratic theory.

But while Ma cpher

son argues that the concept of man as infinite consumer is
incompatible with an equally forceful postulate of Western
democratic theory, the concept of every man's right to
"maximize," or make the most of his individual human powers,
he does not undertake a critique of the tenuous association
of individuality, or self-maximization, with the privatized
market activity of individual appropriation and consumption.
He recognizes that the right of unlimited appropriation
undermines the universal right of self-realization throughout
Western market society, but he calls for the rejection of the
market concept of man's essence,

i.e., the postulate of man's

essence as infinite consumer and infinite antagonist of
scarcity.^

The original problem of drawing men into the

productive process has been replaced today, he suggests, by
the problem of providing alternative outlets for the human
energy that was previously expended in labor.

Ultimately,

Macpherson implies that the promise of the technological
revolution lies in its capacity to provide universal maximi
zation of individual powers through the established channels
of market activity and, consequently, by means of the modern
psychological phenomenon of individual dependence upon com
modity exchange.

Macpherson's argument thus conforms to the traditional
democratic theorist's assumption of the existence of human
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individuality itself and remains committed to the ideal of
the preservation and guarantee of individual rights by means
of a liberal market economy.

In this sense human individual

ity is understood as an automatic by-product of the physical
separateness of human beings, a matter of their disparate
centers of physical need and mental perspective which are
unalterably bound "inside" the perimeters of the physical
body.

There appears to be no need to call the criteria of

individuality into question from this point of view because
conformity is only the result of external forces, specifi
cally the restriction of personal freedom.
According to this empirical definition of individual
ity, the least imposition of rules and regulations governing
the activities of the individual that is possible within
the social circumstance becomes the concrete expression of
individual freedom.

Concurrently the concept of genuine

human difference is steadily removed into the range of its
politically divisive connotations: conflict, opposition, and
competitive struggle.

Individuality in these terms is the

aspect of everyone's social existence which is threatened by
one's existence as a part of a group and which is most vul
nerable to violation from social engagement.
understanding,

Given this

the suggestion that it is the lack of social

engagement which most endangers the real existence of the
individual appears to be the assertion that the social struc
ture within which one lives ought to be given priority over
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the individual.

And in the age of modern democracy a con

ferral of normative priority upon any framework of social
organization which can be understood as a (or the) state
is in no uncertain terms a declaration of the institutional
denial of individual freedom and autonomy.

To the extent that individual freedom is defined
as the absence of the influence of external pressures upon
individual thought and action the common concept of totali^
tarianism is the coerced submission to commands and authori
tarian directives which issue from the higher levels of a
hierarchically arranged governmental structure.

Indeed,

structural totalitarianism epitomizes the violation of indi
viduality because it discards the significance of the individ
ual moral conscience in practical and ethical decision-making
and denies the right of the individual to self-determination.
But because the concept thus derives from a quantitative
analysis of the rights and liberties withheld by the state,
the dimension of individual oppression which can occur wi th 
out the presence of officers who give orders,enforcement
squadrons to back them up, or the existence of such wretched
living circumstances as would force an otherwise proud in
dividual into the attitude of a slave remain hidden.
The concept of totalitarianism may imply individual
oppression, but when that oppression is wholly understood as
a matter of legal concerns and political structure the need
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to establish the reality of human individuation in order to
defend it is forgotten.

Instead,

it seems enough if one's

sociopolitical situation is such that, should the occasion
arise in which one's dissent is evoked, dissent is theo
retically conceivable in terms of one's political,
ideological, freedom to disagree.

i.e.,

Dissent, resistance, and

even autonomy are human capacities which it is understood
can only be protected from the possibility of manipulation
by being totally excluded from the range of public respon
sibility.

But no indictment of the strength and resilience

of the particular will is more clear than that which is re
vealed by the demand for so complete an insulation of the
particular will from external (nonpersonal) influence that
ethical dialogue and debate rarely escape what are by now
the platitudes of relativism.

The necessity of protecting

the single individual from the arbitrary exercise of
authority through force cannot be allowed to create an
acquiescence to the principled ignorance of the fragility
of genuine human individuality because to acquiesce in the
reification of the concept is to quicken the totalitarian
implications of a society which tolerates dissent because
there is none.
THE PROMISE OF THE GROUP;

INDIVIDUALITY

In order to be meaningful the concept of individual
freedom must be grounded in the experience of oneself as a
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being who constitutes an aspect of the group that is only
actualized by means of one's real particular existence.

The

isolated or alienated individual who lives with no conscious
relation to any group except a vague regional or national
identification is deprived of the means for developing a con
crete expression of his own distinctiveness.

For while the

social individual is able to clarify and refine his particular
talents by relying upon the collective activity of the group,
the isolated or alienated person must face the whole range of
his needs and wants alone.

The capacity to meet the imperative

of production and reproduction requisite for the maintenance
of life is not in itself a sufficient condition for the reali
zation of one's human being, i.e., for unique self-development.
The human organization or definition of work is crucial to the
concretization of the possibilities for the human objectifica
tion which the production process should provide insofar as
the mechanization of any human activity locks the individual
into his particular task as a nonthinking part of a whole which
is externally orchestrated.

In this sense the assembly-line

wage earner and the aspiring "self-sufficient" refugee from
the wage labor system share the alienated consciousness of
workers for whom there is no alternative to routine and repe
titious labor.

For those who escape direct participation in

the dehumanized process of production, as well as for those
who do not, there is no perception of the violation of human
rights inherent in the exclusive atomistic approach to the
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satisfaction of human need.
The repression of the possibilities for genuinely
human development intrinsic to the processes of production
is reinforced and amplified with the identification of
’human individual' and undifferentiated (abstract) 'con
sumer*.

As a systematic feature of modern bourgeois society,

isolated market activity has become the major focus of human
interaction because the fixed nature of market exchange a p 
pears to be the best, if not the only, guarantee of freedom
for individual taste and inclination.

At the present stage

of monopoly capitalism the array of commodities must be
recognized as at least a psychological placebo which although
impotent in terms of real individual development, somehow
manages to sedate the vital human drive for self-actualization,
Thus the pleasing availability and accessibility of goods
(and services) which promise both instant gratification of
desire and the most rapid execution of any given endeavor
possible binds human creativity.

The suggestion that the

necessary processes of objectification, i.e., the spatial,
temporal realization of the self in the world, can be a m a t 
ter of "good business" constricts the possibilities for human
becoming by replacing the ideal of human excellence with the
type of market omnipotence.
When the twenty-four hours of a typical citizen's
day in modern technological-industrial society are accounted
for, it is clear that cooperative, collective human endeavor
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is attacked on two fronts:

First, in our place and time of

employment by the pervasive alienation of the laborer, and
then in our place and time of "personal life" by the pallia
tive of consumption.

As it becomes more and more difficult

to escape the glitter of the aggregated market array, it is
proportionately more and more difficult to engage directly
with other human beings, despite the increasing proportion
of "free" time, i.e., time not absolutely required by p r o 
ductive labor, in which to do so.

The direct relation b e 

tween the increasing potential for individual freedom and
the increasingly collective character of production must be
dismissed by the understanding which grounds individual free
dom in the opposition of private being and economic activity
(both production and consumption).

By denying the fact and

the necessity of continuity in human endeavor, the mythically
fragmented character of economic activity has become the
standard by which all human relationships, all processes of
human objectification, are understood.

Thus the individual's

"freedom" is his "right" to acquire and dispose of both
property and personal relationships at will.
To the extent that the family provides the structure
for and the justification of a commitment to other individ
uals which spontaneously takes priority over personal impulse
and even personal need, the family realizes an essential
feature of subversive, i.e., revolutionarily free, society.
But it is only when such a commitment is made eagerly and
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almost unconsciously as a natural striving of the self towards
its own fulfillment that the family presents the genuinely
social experience, the perception of others as essential to
individual being.

When family commitment is expressed in

terms of self-sacrifice, defined as a duty, and treated as
a "proof" of moral conscience the family itself must at base
represent the perceived limits to personal growth because it
is ultimately understood only as a responsibility, i.e., a
burden, undertaken out of deference to social custom.

And

to the degree that the most elementary experience of social
human life is appropriated as an institution of a particular
social-economic order, the experience ceases to be the means
for human development and appears instead as a source of
human oppression.
THE FAMILY AS THE STARTING POINT

When Aristotle undertook the project of analyzing
m a n ’s political being he began with an analysis of the family.
While the central task of his Politics is the identification
and definition of the state or political community which aims
at the "highest" good, Aristotle’s method requires that the
first book of the Politics be given over to a study of the
family and its constitutive parts:

the household economy,

the slave property, children, and wives.

"As in other depart

ments of science, so in politics, the compound should always
be resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the
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whole,he

writes, indicating that to approach the concept

of the state without investigating its origins would be to
deny the most basic elements of political association and
thereby invite the represssion of those basic human rela
tionships.
Aristotle's contention is that the state naturally
precedes both the family and the individual because the
"whole is of necessity prior to the part"^ and because the
individual is radically dependent upon the state, but it is
family relationships which he finds fundamentally determina
tive with respect to political relationships.

Not only are

they analogous, as in the comparison of the king's relation
ship to his subjects with the paternal relationship of
father to son, but family relationships also imply the kinds
of political relationships which define the community.

Thus

Aristotle advises the education of women and children be
"trained with an eye to the constitution" because most of
these individuals are or will become citizens.^

To the extent

that every individual begins his life in a state of dependency
upon the limited community of the family, Aristotle recognized
the family experience as the archetypical process of human
intercourse.

Aristotle was the first of many social theorists

in the Western tradition to suggest that the family is the
active model of political existence insofar as it initiates
every individual citizen into an increasingly broad and more
complex network of dependency relationships that ultimately
define human community.

Aristotle, however, did not question

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

20

the nature of those relationships.
Nearly 2,000 years later, J. J. Rousseau began his
analysis of political society with the assertion that the
7

family is the primitive model of political societies.

For

Rousseau it is specifically the father%s care for his chil
dren as it compares to the task of governing the citizens
of the state which marks the important connection between
the family and the state for it is his sense that the
existence of both kinds of societies is grounded in the
need of their members for that society.

The natural "physi

cal" family comes into being only when the preservation of
the children requires it and disintegrates when they are
grown.

Similarly, the association of individuals in the

body politic

(state) is fundamentally the result of man's

inability to preserve himself as an isolated individual in
the "State of Nature."

Rousseau's concept of the social

contract rests as much on the principle of voluntarily sub
mitting to a supreme authority in order to further one's
self-interest as did the Hobbesian scheme, insofar as the
"General Will" is endowed with the authority to act in the
best interests of the citizens.

But for Rousseau that

authority is as subject to critical evaluation and j u d g 
ment as we commonly believe the exercise of paternal author
ity in the family is today, for it is only in order to pro
tect and further the common good that Rousseau suggests the
centralization of political authority.

Thus it is only to
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the extent that the benefit of the governed is realized that
human authority, political or paternal, is justified.
Rousseau's analysis of the basic meaning of social organiza
tion takes advantage of the family's immediate involvement
with the health of its members in such a way as to render the
concept of authority into a concept of practical human
strength.
With Hegel's identification of the family as the
source of the state's ethical being the concept of this pri 
mary human community is linked not simply to the necessity of
human cooperation but to the fundamental possibility of moral
human life.

The substance of the family in Hegel's analysis

is expressed in the common interest and common identity of
all of the family's members as a whole and to the extent that
the family constitutes a moment of universality which each
individual recognizes his particular interest only in terms
of the interest of the whole, the family's actions have an
ethical character.

Hegel's concept of ethical human being

thus begins not in the range of personal commitments and
judgments but

rather with the subjective experience of the

significance of the welfare and "happiness," broadly speak
ing, of others.

According to the Hegelian dialectic it is

out of the consciousness of oneself as a being who transcends
his individuality that the true nature of morality arises,
i.e., the appreciation of every subjective expression of
being as an expression of the necessary and genuinely free
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(Universal Spirit) and the consequent recognition of the ir
reducible value of every individual as an essential aspect
of the necessary, objective Being.
It is clear that, despite its decidedly nonpublic
character, the concept of the family has occupied an impor
tant place in social-political theory from the earliest
efforts to analyze human society.

Even as the actual family

in American society loses its grip upon the individual, the
concept of the family still contributes significantly as a
model of social human relations to the continuing efforts to
understand the nature of the individual’s integration into
the social whole.

In a recently published article, "Marx,

Sex, and the Transformation of Society," Virginia Held sug
gests that M a r x ’s statement of the definitive nature of the
man-woman relationship

(’’, . . the relation of man to woman

is the most natural relation of human being to human being.
It therefore reveals the extent to which m a n ’s natural beo

havior has become human. . . . ’’)

is a possible model for

the development of human relationships which will be able to
transcend the bourgeois tenet of self-interest and mutual
use by individuals of one another to their own advantage.
Held argues that M a r x ’s conception of the man-woman
relationship as the sensuous manifestation, the observable
fact of the extent to which the human essence has become
nature to man, can profitably direct both our reflective
understanding of and our concretely present search for the
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genuinely cooperative society.

The strength of this argu

ment, it seems to me, lies in the reality of our knowledge
of and engagement in relationships which are specifically
characterized by a true mutuality of concern and respect
for other human beings,

for it is the experience of a self

transcendent concern and love for human being which sig^
nificantly challenges the bourgeois definition of man as a
grasping, infinitely desirous, egotistical, center of wants
and needs.

Held goes on to suggest that to the extent that

the man-woman relationship can defy the asocial imperatives
of bourgeois consciousness it might profitably be studied
as a key to the nature of sound alternatives to the concept
of community which assumes a natural antagonism between any
two individuals.
Furthermore, we can observe that the social and
political theory most in need of development, and
probably of greatest interest in recent years, is
the theory of community.
An understanding of the
relation between man and woman has not yet really
begun to be tapped for insights into conceptions
of community, though it is probably the most fruit
ful source of insight for such conceptions, and for
discovering whatever it is that lies deepest at the
heart of society.9
It is my contention that while the man-woman relationship
does manifest at least the potential for a radically alterna
tive approach to human relations in general, that potential
is stunted and repressed by the imposition of restrictive
family forms
upon it.

(most commonly patriarchal family structures)

An equally grave threat however, to the realization
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of that potential is inherent in the modern devaluation of
family life and commitments, for the expansion of atomistic
self-perception can only be at the expense of what sense of
collectivity and mutuality we still possess.
THE FAMILY AS TOTALITARIAN:

HORKHEIMER'S

CATEGORY OF AUTHORITY
In his essay "Authority and the Family," Max Horkheimer argues that authority is a central category for his 
tory insofar as men's personalities, their "drives and
passions, their characteristic dispositions and reaction
patterns," are shaped by and reflect the power-relationships
which define the social life-process of their particular
time.
Over the whole time-span embraced by historical
writing, men have worked in more or less willing
obedience to command direction. . . . Because the
activity which kept society alive and in the
accomplishment of which men were therefore molded
occurred in submission to an external power, all
relationships and patterns of reaction stood under
the sign of authority.10
Although the bourgeois revolution began as the
struggle against the authority of tradition and the estab
lished social hierarchy, Horkheimer contends that authoritymotivated behavior and authority-based thinking were far
from outmoded.

The rise of bourgeois individualism cen

tered around the demand for freedom from the old bonds of
feudal relationships of dependence which were becoming
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increasingly untenable as the feudal mode of production
failed to meet the needs of an increasing population and
civil and ecclesiastical bureaucracies became unable to deal
with an increasingly complex society.

However, the bourgeois

revolution introduced not only a new authority but new forms
of dependency relationships upon that authority as well,
viz. the dependence of both producer and consumer upon m a r 
ket activity as dictated by the reified authority of the
economy which is both immune to and alien from the influence
of men's collective and conscious direction.
Instead of treating submission to economic circum
stances as a part of one's dependency upon socially estab
lished authoritarian relationships bourgeois philosophy
sought to ground the inevitable dependence of the individual
upon his social context in natural circumstances and to p r e 
sent the justification of that dependence as insight into
eternal matters of fact.

11

Obedience and submission to the

needs of the established structure of social production
could no longer be compelled by the imperative of maintain
ing a proper relationship to God once the link between
earthly social-political order and God's purposes was broken.
For bourgeois consciousness authority became ".

. . not even

a relationship but an inalienable property of the superior
being, a qualitative difference."

12

The rational, self-

sufficient man, who is the paradigm of bourgeois conscious
ness, voluntarily adapts to natural authority of economic
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necessity and its attendant class divisions and property sys
tems out of rational self-interest.
Here then, is a philosophical system in which the
individual is conceived, not in his involvement
with society and nature, but abstractly and as a
purely intellectual essence, a being which must
now think of the world and acknowledge it as an
eternal principle and perhaps as the expression
of his own true b e i n g . l3
The patriarchal family is the fundamental social in
stitution by means of which the individual is habituated to
the authority relationships of bourgeois society, Horkheimer
suggests.

Both the father’s natural strength and his capac

ity to earn and/or possess all of the family’s money repre
sent natural facts against which children must not rebel and
for which they must have esteem.

"In consequence of the

seeming naturalness of paternal power

. . . growing up in

the restricted family is a first-rate schooling in the
authority behavior specific to this s o c i e t y . W h e n

as an

adult the individual finds himself subject to the authority
of the social network of economic relationships and without
any means of redress of appeal, any perception of the contra
diction of his theoretical sovereignty and freedom as a
rational being is occluded by his familiarity with the neces
sity of accepting social circumstances as they are and
"adapting" to reality.

The c h i l d ’s dependence upon the

patriarchal, restricted family smoothly translates into the
adult’s dependence upon the amorphous and alien economic
system of bourgeois society insofar as both group forms
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repress communal reflection and decision and amplify the
perception of so-called "natural," i.e., reified authority.
For the formation of the authority-oriented char
acter it is especially decisive that the children
should learn, under pressure from the father, not
to trace every failure back to its social causes
but to remain at the level of the individual and
to hypostatize the failure in religious terms as
sins or in naturalistic terms as deficient natural
endowment.15
Horkheimer's critique of the traditional patriarchal
family presents an exceptionally clear analysis of the
appropriation of the means for human intercourse and develop
ment by particular economic interests.

To the extent that

the situation of human intimacy and mutual concern is struc
tured by rigid domination-servitude relationships it is clear
that the unique potential of both child and adult is denied.
But if Horkheimer's argument that authority is a basic h i s 
torical category is accepted it is also clear that the family
cannot be disassociated from the exercise of authority simply
by the recognition that traditional paternal authority is
largely arbitrary.

At the practical level of production in

response to material need the processes of organizing, d i 
recting, and focusing the collective capacities of men will
always require that some authority be exercised and obeyed
if that capacity is to be most profitably exploited.

Al

though the family today is rarely the productive economic
unit it once was, the division of labor and various delega
tions of responsibility which still occur demonstrate a
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recognition of the authority of the source of that organiza
tion and decision-making which stabilizes the family around
its own particular structure.

And despite its innovative

appearance, the mere substitution of the woman for the man,
or a maternal for a paternal figure of authority, is only
incidentally effective in retrenching the family's function
of instilling an "authoritarian consciousness" in its m e m 
bers when the ultimate responsibility for the family's
business and welfare is understood as a form of dictatorial
license.

More importantly, however, the unalterable and u n 

deniable dependence of the family's children upon the strength
and competency of its adults is a small scale model of the
necessary dependence of all individuals upon others with
greater experience, resources, or ability.

In this sense,

to refuse to recognize the authority of another's competence
or understanding is to pursue a self-destructive kind of
"independence."
The vacuum created by ignoring the need for an e s 
tablished means of reaching an ultimate decision or of con
solidating a collective effort is all too quickly filled by
the anonymous authority of impersonal economic interests.
While the perpetuation of the traditional relationships of
authority within the family is, as Horkheimer suggests, the
perpetuation of a repressive conditioning for assimilation
into an alienated work force, the refusal to recognize that
human life and growth is inevitably structured by the
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exercise of authority creates a situation in which individ
uals are no more capable of self-direction than when selfdirection is deliberately denied.

In the absence of long-

range planning, firm decisions, and a reliable source of
judgment individual freedom is lost to the confusion of
immediate appeal and impulse which ultimately denies the
capacity to choose by obstructing the experience of genuine
choice.

To the extent that autonomy depends upon rational

thought and choice it is clear that the necessary exercise
of authority must be such that individual thought and action
is encouraged and yet focused upon those interests that are
genuinely universal.

Therefore the struggle to reclaim the

family for the individual is inseparable from the struggle
for self-government and autonomy.

The tradition of repre

sentative democracy would seem to demonstrate that an appeal
to participatory government is neither radical nor innova
tive, but it is not the procedures of debate and compromise
that are most significantly in question with respect to the
family's structure.

Rather it is the determination to bring

the facts and circumstances of one's life within the range
of human control by means of a conscious recognition of and
understanding of collective interdependence and productivity
which must direct the exercise of authority.

Thus in order

to undermine and abolish the formation of the authorityoriented character which is incapable of understanding or
even assessing its social situation and which is locked into
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a privatized individualism that prevents any possible over
coming of "natural" facts, it is crucial that the family
provide an experience of collective learning, consideration,
calculation, and decision-making;

i.e., an experience in

which the actions of the group are authorized by a single
voice that is spoken by all.
THE FAMILY AS A COLLECTIVE
In order to exist the family must be able to command
from its members a recognition of and a commitment to its
independent being.

This means, however, that each individual

member must find himself addressed in another entity (the
group)

for which he is a necessary but never a sufficient

condition.

When the family must impose such a commitment

upon the individuals of whom it consists, an imposition in
which the family is particularly successful, the family
exists as a social institution that has broken with its human
content and no longer represents a structure in which the
continuing process of human development is focused and fos
tered.

If any individual who is counted as one of the fam

ily's members in terms of his contribution to the family's
working or playing activities and in terms of his dependence
upon the family's resources is at the same time excluded from
the concept of the family as only one of an assortment of
particular beings who have been collected under its familial
rubric, the family itself is dead.

While the institutional
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structure may continue to function within the system of social
and economic relationships as the administrative agency most
directly concerned with distribution and reproduction, the
"family" that must return to an identification of the tradi
tional or empirical connections between its members in order
to demonstrate its coherence only succeeds in demonstrating
the alienation of those individuals from that which is essen
tially theirs.
1.

Form versus Content
The picture of two or three generations of biologi

cally related persons living together is one of the more rare
instances of family life in modern society.

We have not,

however, abandoned the concept of the family to the archives
of outmoded customs but rather seem to be seeking to give it
a new and historically more appropriate application.

To the

extent that we can no longer rely on the external form to
identify the family, i.e., the presence of hetero-sexual
parents, children, grandparents, and assorted "kin," we
must reconsider the relationships existing between individuals
who are living together in a shared situation under shared
circumstances.

When familial traits must be acknowledged in

a group, e.g., a sense of some degree of mutual responsibility
for one another's welfare and a desire to consider every m e m 
ber of the group when a decision is made, the group has a
legitimate claim to the identity of a family.
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Furthermore, the criterion of family substance must
refer to the emotional relationships which bind particular
individuals together.

Thus a legally recognized relation

ship, e.g., marriage or the parent-child relationship, may
prove to be much less substantial as a family relationship
than one which is wholly based in a nonlegal commitment.
Our concern for the family as a fundamentally human rela
tionship cannot be anachronistically limited to an asso
ciation of individuals who share a common genetic heritage
for two reasons:

First, because to do so would be to deny

the historical movement from the sense of the primacy of
the biological relationships to the contemporary sense that
the biological relationship may be less meaningful, if not
meaningless,
contacts.

in comparison with all newly possible human

Secondly, as a result of the realization that

one is not limited to the society of one's traditional fam
ily, the individual is presented with the possibility of
moving beyond the merely formal or legalistic family rela
tionships on which he would have been so acutely dependent
in the past.

While this freedom of movement threatens the

traditional concepts of family cohesion and family commit
ment, it is nevertheless the source of the possibility for
a genuinely human family.

Without the freedom to move out

of cruel, or stultifying, or simply unsatisfactory relation
ships individuals were locked into a structure of interper
sonal relationships which were frequently shaped by a sense
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of the unquestionable "rightfulness” of authoritarianism or
the inevitability of being "claimed" by some social group in
a random fashion.
Traditionally, the family into which one is born
represents the primary "given" in an individual’s life, the
condition and fact of his existence that predates his ability
to accept or reject or change such conditions as will exert
a considerable influence upon his own being.

The extent to

which the notion of rational deliberation seems inappropriate
to an identification of families and how they are formed r e 
flects the special, almost a priori status that must be
allowed the family as a biological or legal entity insofar
as the family in these terms cannot be recognized as an ob
ject of rational consideration.

Instead the family which

understands its own identity as essentially the material prod
uct of actual human reproduction, or the intent to reproduce,
epitomizes the experience of what amounts to an arbitrary sub
ordination of the individual to a social structure.
2. The Human Development of Individuality
Since the notion of social interdependence confuses
the picture of a self-reliant individual who need not com
promise his impulses or desires, the working model for social
relationships in civil society has become that structure of
efficiency and human indifference which best seems to guar
antee fair and sufficient distribution of the social product
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without interfering in the individual's personal life.

Against

the antagonistic character of the activity by which one p a r 
ticipates in "productive" society, the family stands as an
experience of group participation which assumes not only the
right but the responsibility to penetrate the dimensions of
"personal" concerns such as emotional health, ambitions, and
even one's moral codes and standards.

Clearly this level of

involvement subjects the individual family member to a greater
or lesser degree of psychological domination, perhaps rein
forced with physical domination, that openly seeks to prevent
the individual from behavior that is simply the acting out
of his innate and "unpolluted" proclivities.

Nor is this

"interference" with the individual's behavior and conscious
ness limited to the children of the family who seem most
legitimately subject to adult guidance and training, for the
family experience necessarily includes all of its members in
the actualization of the values,

and beliefs, by which it

knows itself as a particular group.

Without the active expres

sion of individuality consciously attempting to implement the
principles of a specific behavior the group has no substan
tiality either as a cohesive association or as the social unit
which counters and ameliorates the deliberate indifference of
civil society towards the essentially human dimension of life,
i.e., towards both the spiritual, ethical, aesthetic dimen
sions of the individual and his reflective understanding of
these dimensions.
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Thus to the extent that the "personal" realm of b e 
lief and value is the stuff (content) of human intercourse
within the family the inevitably direct and personal engage
ment of individual family members with one another simul
taneously makes the existence of genuinely human value a real
possibility and opens the door to an arbitrary control and
manipulation of that human value.

In this sense the capacity

of the family to override the independent integrity of its
members by means of an authoritarian disregard for individ
uality eludes the simplistic either/or disjunction.

To in

sist that the level of immediate interaction which charac
terizes family relationships should be transposed from the
limited and therefore personalized context of a family group
to the extended and impersonal context of civil society in
general is to ignore the necessary conditions of a relation
ship which can engage individuality without controlling it.
At the same time, the restriction of relationships which seek
out and express, and consequently develop, not only the
unique aspects of one's being but also the means of dis
tinguishing between autonomy and heteronomy (or decision and
suggestion)

is to mistake the accidental arbitration of

human association (i.e., the biological or legal definition
of family) for the truly necessary mediation of all human
being.
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3. The Group as Sponsor
Through its multitude of forms and adaptations the
family (as a concept) epitomizes the experience of human con^
cern for others.

Regardless of how many people a particular

family includes or what their actual blood relationship to
one another is, the mark of their specifically familial unity
is a more or less constant perception of one another as beings
whose presence or absence is of utmost significance.

Each

individual member of the family makes a unique contribution
to the identity of his family by standing apart from his "rela
tives" as an individual who is known in terms of his specific
personality and potential.

He stands out as a particular ex

pression of the being of the whole which no other family m e m 
ber is capable of expressing.

He is, in a very literal

sense, an irreplaceable element of the family group for his
personality,

i.e., his individual nature, is not simply

acknowledged to be only his alone but is specifically valued
by the group as a manifestation of the diversity and real
human richness of the group.
To the extent that this individual does enjoy the
trust and tolerance and support of his family, he experiences
at a very elementary but psychologically essential level the
meaning of individual freedom.

While he may have little or

no understanding of the legal significance of individual
rights, the family's recognition of and esteem for his di s
tinct, personal being must suggest the real basis of
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individual development and being, i.e,, the freedom to
actualize and extend the dimensions of the self in an autono
mous fashion.
As Marx has described, human beings who are totally
submerged in the crude and brutal struggle to meet their
physical needs do not have the specifically human capacity
to draw the sensual and intellectual distinctions which
mark human perceptions as profoundly other than animal or
nonhuman perception.

Similarly, human beings who are con

sumed by the struggle to assert their private claims to the
products of human society against the same claims of others
are submerged in the undifferentiated categorization of all
human being.

The abstract articulation of personal rights

as an elementary ideological premise ultimately acts against
the realization of individuality by reducing the significant
aspects of individual being to the concerns of administered
equality.

Thus "individuality" implies the right to be in

distinguishable from everyone else insofar as everyone has
the same right to work for the same wages in order to be
able to afford the same level of market activity which is
generally assessed as necessary for a "typical" kind of w e l l 
being.

Of course,

it cannot be forgotten that far too many

people do not begin to enjoy the typical or standard level
of well-being, not only outside the United States but inside
as well.

The fact of substandard living conditions and the

correlative reduction of educational and employment and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

38

ultimately human opportunities underscores the immediate ur^
gency of a quantitative economic distribution of goods and
services.

But it is only within the context of an institu

tional tendency to dismiss the general, undifferentiated
claims to the means of human life that the use of the "flat"
sense of individuality is justified.
THE BETRAYAL:

THE FAMILY VERSUS

THE INDIVIDUAL
Whether because of its conceptual proximity to the
most basic concerns of human existence (food, shelter, r e 
production) or because of its status as an absolute given
against which reason should have no appeal lest the "natural"
(as distinct from the human and therefore morally fallible)
order of things be violated, the family thus stands opposed
to the individual.

It is not only the first social group or

unit to claim him as a dependent but also the first to d e 
mand that he represent the specific character and being of
the group in his individual thoughts and actions.

On the

one hand the individual's family holds the resources which
are indeed necessary to his being, i.e., it must provide for
his physical needs in at least a minimal fashion and, for
better or worse, it inevitably fulfills the classic socializ
ing functions, transmitting the culture, language, values,
etc. which enable the individual to participate in human
society.

On the other hand, the delegation of this
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responsibility to the family dictates a relationship of d e 
pendency between the individual and the group which can r e 
duce the individual to a simple functionary.

In this sense

the family tie no longer simply sustains the individual by
means of the family's capacity to meet his basic

(physio

logical and psychological) needs and wants, but actually
generates a submissive consciousness in the individual who
must find a place within the family "unity" rather than
create one.
To be sure, this family exhibits the tangible prop
erties of a group, i.e., the association of two or more
individuals, a general identity which exceeds that of any
single individual, etc., but it does so on the basis of an
ultimately arbitrary or happenstance collectivity.

The bio

logical criteria of family relationships is fundamentally an
institutionalization of the result of certain actions and
circumstances over which we have not yet achieved total con
trol.

What modern science and technology have been able to

accomplish is the deliberate prevention of conception or
denial of conception (abortion), i.e., the obstruction of
the normal processes of reproduction which would otherwise
result in the creation of a new, individual life.

But when

those processes are not obstructed or interfered with, they
remain as much beyond the control of human rationality and
planning as they have ever been.

Thus the extent to which

the creation of potential human individuality is still the
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object of human reproduction remains a critical problem for
the biological definition of the family.
When we respond to an occasion of successful human
birth with a profound sense of joy and wonder we express
more than a simple, unqualified delight at the miracle of
life.

Human life in its temporal and finite form is the

means by which any given set of circumstances can be over
come, for it is not only subject to the conditions with
which it shares the character of material reality but also
possesses the capacity to understand them.

Thus far human

being has retained the capacity to deviate from predictable
responses, i.e., to sustain an adherence to concepts and
principles and beliefs in the face of circumstantial and
situational pressure(s) to deny them, and in so doing has
persisted in the unfolding of real, existent value.

But it

is only to the extent that individuals can envision the
situation that ought to be, that a challenge is made to the
one that is, and that vision, for all its universal applica
tion, is fundamentally a product of particular perception.
Similarly it is the unique expression of the artist’s vision
or the musician’s composition which forms the tangible con
tribution to the realization of the human capacity for
aesthetic creation and while it is the understanding of
universals which inspires that work, it must be carried out
by individuals.

Thus each particular human birth, understood

as distinctively human, is the occasion of paradigmatic
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renewal for it represents the reality of possible human
progress and achievement that will always historically ex
ceed the world as it is.
When individuals are bound to a specific group either
by virtue of their blood relationships or by relationships
grounded in a legal commitment their integration into that
group can reduce to a merely nominal claim of connectedness
and yet be taken as a kind of "evidence" that one is not
alone in the world,

i.e., as a hedge against the "quiet des

peration" of alienated individualism.

In this sense, b i o 

logical and legal ties are understood to be the substantial
social relationships without which the individual would be
simply absorbed by the wider society which surrounds him.
To the extent that the social reality is such that only the
conceptual absence of human confrontation and engagement can
structure and clarify the notion of individual rights and
freedoms, this sense of the family arbitrates the apparent
conflict between the social

(i.e., human) needs of the in

dividual and his life as a "free and equal" citizen.
Historically the presence of mutual concern and love
between family members appears as a kind of luxury in that
it was possible and even necessary to maintain the family
despite their absence.

The modern development of the in

dividual's capacity to live alone marks our era as a period
in which family relationships are remarkably voluntary.
Which family,

if any, the individual will accept as a
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constitutive principle if his life depends upon the rela
tionship between the demands made upon the individual by
the group and his own demands with respect to what the fam
ily is able to provide for him.

When the family appears

as the object of a conflict between the individual’s need
for the intimacy of family life and his need for personal
freedom it betrays an unnecessary antagonism between its
institutional structure and its human "elements."
THE PROMISE OF THE INDIVIDUAL:

THE GROUP

Social identity must rest upon the real character of
a social group as it is manifested in the several particular
expressions of human being by which it is comprised if it is
to avoid the totalitarian alternative, viz. the derivation
of individual identity from the contrived collective repre
sentation of the state or group.

Without the existence of

the individual the group has only an abstract, though not
necessarily rational, kind of identity insofar as it is u n 
related to the material development of its real being, the
individual.

Profoundly inhuman implications must always

accompany this authoritarian kind of social identity which
can be imposed upon any subject in the manner of empty
categorization as determined by any arbitrarily chosen
conceptual

(i.e., ideological) arrangement.

To the extent that the individual’s significance is
reduced to his function as representative of and contributor
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to the social identity which both precedes and supercedes
him, individual development and growth is reduced to the
exercise of duty and obedience to orders for which the
superior being and purpose of the group is the only author
ity.

In this situation, the determination to weld a social

identity out of the available human resource assumes the
power both to discharge individuality in the name of a
greater, because collectively stronger, being and to ascer
tain the essential nature of that collective being without
reference to its real elements.

Thus individuals who acci

dentally share certain characteristics such as place of
birth or race are united around a sense of commonality
which is defined in terms of a deliberately exclusive sense
of humanity and human potential.

The ultimate perversion

of the collective consciousness of a group experience is
the denigration of personal moral reflection which not only
denies the classical definition of the self-directive man
but also represses the rational perception of genuinely
universal human relationships, i.e., those which transcend
the diversity of circumstance without devaluing it.
Any group which assumes the power of conferring the
substance of on e’s identity upon its members as that iden
tity is defined by the needs of the group demonstrates an
obliviousness to the means and the value of human being that
readily facilitates the operation of particular interests.
If the ideology clearly pronounces the futility and absurdity
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o£ individual effort as in a totalitarian or fascist society
there is no question but that the group, as it is consoli
dated into a representation of whatever interests find them
selves able to dominate its endeavors, merely employs human
being as the means by which the group acts.

On the other

hand, where the ideological articulation of the group's
nature retains the concept of individuality as a central
tenet of its own theory, it cannot be automatically u nder
stood as a demonstrably significant or real value.

But even

when the idea of individuality is allowed only a superficial
justificatory function in the conceptual framework of social
institutions its strength as a fundamental human value m i l i 
tates against the complete subordination of the individual
within his society.

As long as the social body is at least

nominally dedicated to the protection of every individual's
existence as a unique particular it must employ the term
which has the power to suggest challenge and refusal on the
part of the individual.

While genuine human difference is

clearly threatened by the recession of its possibilities,
the emphasis upon the evil of any social tampering with in
dividual identity and will can sustain a conceptual tension
between social identity and individual being from which a
critical attitude towards the demands and values of the group
may grow.

In this sense the democratic premium upon indi

vidual rights and freedoms is, despite its theoretical ab
straction and practical emptiness, crucial to the reality of
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an identity which is separate from that of the group and dif
ferent from that of any other member of the group because it
demands that the presupposed individual be concretely iden
tified.
FROM HUMAN INTIMACY TO HUMAN INTERDEPENDENCE
Within the context of a group individual action is
an embodiment of the interest and purpose of the whole group
for it reflects the shared resources and possibilities of
the common situation.

But the collective character of that

act is only its abstract characterization for as an individ
ual act it underscores the extent to which the collective
identity of the group is constituted by individuals.

That

the group may, and often does, act as a body does not p r e
clude the independent activity of its diverse members who
share the circumstances and conditions of their lives but
not the composition of their souls.

Rather it is from the

foundation of the recognition of their common interests that
each member's separate identity emerges because it is in
that recognition that the opportunity for self-realization
is secured.
Through the recognition of common ends and their
shared efforts to attain those ends each member can be freed
from what would be the overwhelming task of production and
reproduction to meet one's personal needs in much the manner
of Marx's analysis of the collective character of labor.
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Within the family, however, the collective capacity to pro 
mote individual freedom is not a matter of the expansive
potential of cooperation in material production but rather
issues from the concept of the family as the objective struc'
ture within which subjective human being is able to take its
individual shape and form.

The freedom for individuality

that is offered by the family thus only begins with the iden
tification of the family's fundamental purpose with an ad e
quate provision for personal needs.

In an epoch marked by

an increasingly rapid establishment of "public" institutions
which are not only capable of, but even sometimes better at,
fulfilling the traditional functions of the family, the
radical value of the family is its capacity to provide both
the concept of and the experience of those conditions of
human intimacy and engagement which are essential to the ex
pression and development of true human individuality.
But to the extent that the being of the family can
only exist as the active processes of becoming by means of
which each individual member becomes himself, the alienation
of family members is far more than an appropriation of p ro p
erty understood in the possessive sense.

Rather, the family

that stands in opposition to its members as an independently
established entity denies to those individuals the funda
mental experience of oneself as simultaneously subject and
object.

Until one can understand that he is an essential

constituent of a social group which appears as "other",
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apart and at a distance from himself, there is little real
possibility of his assuming responsibility for its actions
except or until he can claim exclusive leadership.

When

the family appears distinctly other and different the ele
mentary experience of social human being for the individual
is so dominated by limitations and restraints, that the con
cept of social groups cannot escape its influence, not sim
ply because of the individual's personal fear but most im
portantly because that paradigm group which should be
available as a concise and uncluttered model of collective
work and play is missing.

The shallow scientistic understand

ing of the anthropological conclusion that man is a "gregarious'
animal is revealed in the experience of even our most intimate
and basic relationships as a part of an involuntary association
with others who do not necessarily find our own (subjective)
interests expressing theirs.

The current tendency to push the

sociologist to a more and more "scientific" accumulation of
data on human nature and its manipulation by the group increas
ingly appears to be the only alternative the anarchic anti
resolutions of the continuing conflict between family respon
sibilities and personal freedom.

But the scientific socio

logical management of human collectivity will no more be the
form of either self-determination or self-government than is
the scientific management of the labor process a means of f a 
cilitating the humanization of social labor.
The prospect of a science of human behavior that could
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dictate the necessary conditions for a stable social order
has in its favor the capacity to illuminate the circum
stances in which the individual will relinquish his claim
to the rights of selftdirection.

If such understanding

could motivate the elimination of social structures which
incorporate the individual without expressing him it would
indeed have progressive implications.

However, the deter

mination to manage and control the obstreperous "facts" of
material existence which pervades the scientific approach
thus far suggests that our understanding of human behavior
will be used for systematizing human interaction, particu
larly in order to guarantee and protect the operation of
interdependent production lines.
CONTINUITY VERSUS OPPORTUNITY:

THE

CONFLICT BETWEEN "ME" AND "WE"
Freedom for individual development must imply both
the nonchanging essence which develops and the changing
appearance by which that development is marked, for the
"freedom" which simply permits an episodic accumulation of
varied experience is the means through which human individ
uality is dissipated and spent.

Without the binding force

of a dimension of o n e ’s being that is carried forward into
each new experience and confronted with the challenge of
the possibilities peculiar to that experience, the individ
ual has no resistance against the demands of the new
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situation and must submit to a thorough, internalization of
the sociological phenomena in each ne>r setting.

The v u l 

nerability of the rootless individual can be illustrated by
the common case of accepting employment with a company or
firm towards which one feels initially at odds.

All too

soon the values and beliefs which would set the individual
against the very economic activity that offers him a salary
are forgotten or renounced as the impractical ideals of a
more naive age.

But a parallel dynamic can also be noted

in the flexible identity of the individual who either p u r 
sues or settles for the serial form of interpersonal rela
tionships.

In this case, the cost of preserving his "free

dom" is not solitude but the lack of a truly distinctive
life style or character such as would demand an equally
distinctive companion.
To the extent that the necessity of making such ad
justments is less noticeable as the opportunities for moving
freely from one experience to the next without making sig
nificant commitments to either people or projects increase,
individuality is already a disappearing aspect of human being
Thus in the frantic scramble to program excitement, novelty,
and generally new experience into our lives we tend to find
the same patterns of relationships and learning recurring
again and again despite the variation in circumstance.

In

deed, the possibility of growth through experience already
tends toward a simple resituation and voyeurism insofar as
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the longing for an objective engagement with the world as
other (in general) is diverted into the temporary pleasures
of nonparticipatory entertainment.
On the other hand,

it is a mistake to suppose that

the substance of individuality must always be threatened by
the availability of numerous experiences peculiar to twen
tieth century technological society, for access to conceptual
and circumstantial environments beyond that into which one
is born is as much a prerequisite for the transcendence of
provincialism as it has ever been.

Rather it is the assump

tion that that access alone is sufficient for the discovery
and development of one's being,

i.e., the assumption that

it is only the situational features of one's existence which
are responsible for the promotion or prevention of personal
growth, which must be critically assessed.
In modern society access to the experience of other
environments means not simply mobility and communication but
a devaluation of the bonds which mark an interpersonal rela
tionship for in order to make use of the technological means
of travel and change, one must be able to leave one situation
and enter another.

While this devaluation is apparently co-

existensive with the logic of individual primacy,

it is also

the source of a form of individual oppression against which
the individual is singularly helpless because his resistance
appears to be directed against himself.

It is not often that

the individual who chooses to leave his family or "primary"
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group setting and throw himself as much upon his own r e 
sources as possible is able to walk '’away" from human society.
Rather the act of disconnecting oneself from the social unit
to which one has been related through mutual concern and iden
tification is simultaneously an entry into the social world
which can be perceived as a whole only to the extent that it
can be recognized as a particular collection of individuals.
With the ideology of separate and generally opposed inter
ests predominate and the fear of being maneuvered into an
unprofitable sacrifice of one's own resources pervasive, the
individual faces himself as a being who exists in a crowded
but fundamentally isolated condition.

If it were possible

for him to ignore the inescapable physical proximity of other
human beings the individual would at least be pursuing his
personal interest in a logically defensible manner.

But as

the conceptual and practical dismembering of human effort
continues, and his focus on the particular concerns of his
own abilities and wants intensifies, the occlusion of the
meaning of his individual growth and activity must result.
In this sense the individual is either forced to insist that
his endeavors are solely motivated by a private and incom
municable inspiration towards objective "production" or to
admit that he acts in a wholly impulsive fashion without ref
erence to any kind of constant theme such as would justify
each new attempt.

The catchall explanation of an exclusive

focus on selfish interests, viz. the logic of self-preservation
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extended beyond the facts of a brute animal existence, can
be employed to give a rational veneer to the dictum of
modern competition at the individual level but it is increas
ingly unable to account for the decidedly nonpreserving
attack individuals make upon their own physical and mental
being.

Instead the vacuum produced by the devaluation of

purpose and meaning with respect to human endeavor as a selfinitiated and self-directed and ultimately self^expressive
project is filled by the purpose of a system which operates
not in human qua human-as-^universal interest but only in
the interest of maintaining and expanding a particular locus
of power and authority,
THE VIOLATED POTENTIAL:

ISOLATION

INSTEAD OF INTEGRITY
Although the perversion of the family as a model of
genuinely participatory social-political organization is a
crucial violation of human rights and aspirations, the same
process of alienation that effectively closes the individual
to the real human potential for collective vision and effort
reaches beyond the public dimension of o n e ’s life.

To the

extent that individuality is not a given, i.e., that the
human infant is recognized as an individual only insofar as
the identity of his parents and family are brought to bear
upon him by others and not by virtue of an active assertion
of his own being, the essential human potential for a unique
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(personal) identity remains only a potential unless it is
engaged by the dialectics of human interaction.
is tempting to lean on a part of the (relatively)

Again,

it

scien

tific summation of the processes of human development by
the modern sociologist who also perceives human being as
the product of social life and interaction.

But whereas

the sociological understanding treats human exchange as
the transmission of behavior and language necessary for a
group to function, i.e., as the means by which the " m e 
chanics” of the requisite socialization processes are a c 
complished, the concept of the dialectics on which human
being depends has as its object the realization of human
individuality.

In this sense the interaction between in

dividuals is the mediating activity between that which the
individual is and that which he is not, manifested in a
radically human context.
Not only by means of but because of the inevitably
social character of human existence, paradigmatically illus
trated by the family, human being can achieve a radically
diverse independence.

That independence is and will be c o m 

mensurate with the nature of universal value because its
reality is beyond the influence of particular circumstance
and yet only realized in spatial, temporal, i.e., fully con
crete, terms.

The essence of human individuality cannot be

found in the separation of particular human being from its
universal, i.e., from the concept of the constitutive
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features of human being, for the individuality of isolation
is only by default.

Cut adrift from the regulative princi

ples of human being which can never be so eloquently e x 
pressed in abstraction as to substitute for the communica
tion of beauty or justice or truth in objective human rela
tionships

(i.e., extra-personal or trans-personal), human

individuality is only the shell of a profoundly accidental
and consequently alien being.

But to the extent that the

individual subjectively gathers the universality of human
being into the substance of his particular being and yet
exercises the freedom of that particular material being to
act (in the manner of Kant's autonomous man)

in accord with

his own "legislation" he is not a separate human being made
"individual" by an irresolvable antagonism towards others,
but is rather an individual human being whose separateness
is the result of his being with others.
This is not the separateness of a particular being
who must withhold himself from the interdependent relations
of the group in order to guarantee his freedom to think
differently and perhaps disagree, but rather the separate
ness which is an ontologically constitutive feature of the
human experience.

The point is not to suggest that the

physical discreteness of our bodies may be transcended by
being ignored but rather to illuminate the significance of
the physical limits of ourselves insofar as they both sug
gest separate identity and demarcate what should be the
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difference.

But the discrete character of our physical being

can no more compel genuine individuality than it can defend
the rights and freedoms on which individuality depends, for
in the wake of the processes of social homogenization and
control our physical separateness is only a fragile symbol
of what ought to be the strength and independence of every
human perspective.
The concrete realization of the ontologically human
expression of essential individuality occurs only insofar
as the generality of human being with which every particular
being is born is overcome.

True human difference is a func

tion of the social character of human development for it can
only issue from the experience of human commonality,
the development of the self in human terms.

i.e.,

In the same way

that the humanization (the human development) of the senses
depends upon the exposure of what are initially only the gen
eral capacities of perception, taste, sight, sound, and co g
nition, etc., to their appropriate objects as those objects
reflect historical human being, the development of individ
uality depends upon the interaction with other human individ
uals who embody human history.

It is this confrontation which

defines the difference between the self which grows but never
ceases to be itself and all other human being which, while
infinitely particular in its appearance, forms a totality as
the substance of continuing dialectical relationships to the
individual.
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CONCLUSIO N

Lacking a foundation of values and principles which
recognize in all other human being not only the source but
the guarantee of human life as the unfolding of difference,
personal distinction mutates into the attempt to dominate.
When the concept of qualitative individuality, of the unique
expression of universal human being, is repressed the u n i 
versally human yearning for individuality can be seen to
attempt to command a recognition of the self through the e x 
clusion of others.

Clearly the occlusion of universal human

value, truth, beauty, justice, etc., spawns an ignorance of
human worth which threatens all individuality by suggesting
that the only possible transcendence of human generality is
the egotism of crude survival and conquest.

In the same

vein, the persistent fear of actualizing the universality of
human being, as manifested in the failure of families and the
preoccupation with personal freedom, has already resulted in
a mass mockery of what is in truth the most precious and most
difficult of human achievements.

But this mockery pales in

significance beside the alternatives to a genuine individ
uality:

The eclipse of the concept of individuality as an

active process and the concrete completion of its reifica
tion, the fully particularized individual.
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